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ELDAR HABER*
Recently, toys have become more interactive than ever before. The 
emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) makes toys smarter and more 
communicative: they can now interact with children by “listening” to 
them and responding accordingly. While there is little doubt that these 
toys can be highly entertaining for children and even possess social and 
educational benefits, the Internet of Toys (IoToys) raises many 
concerns. Beyond the fact that IoToys devices might be hacked or 
simply misused by unauthorized parties, datafication of children by toy 
conglomerates, various interested parties, and perhaps even their 
parents could be highly troubling. It could profoundly threaten 
children’s right to privacy by subjecting and normalizing them to 
ubiquitous surveillance and datafication of their personal information, 
requests, and any other information they divulge. While American 
policymakers acknowledged the importance of protecting children’s
privacy online back in 1998 when crafting Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA), this regulatory framework might become 
obsolete in the face of the new privacy risks that arise from IoToys. Do 
fundamental differences between websites and IoToys necessitate a 
different legal framework to protect children’s privacy? Should 
policymakers recalibrate the current legal framework to adequately 
protect the privacy of children who have IoToys devices? Finally, what 
are the consequences for children’s privacy of ubiquitous parental 
surveillance through IoToys—allegedly granted to safeguard children 
from online risks? And how might children’s privacy be better framed 
and protected in this context?
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This Article focuses on the privacy concerns that IoToys raises. Part II
briefly outlines the evolution of IoToys while examining its devices’
capacity to collect and retain data. Then, in reference to the legal 
framework chosen to protect children from online datafication twenty 
years ago, Part III discusses the American perception of children’s
privacy, focusing on COPPA. Through this analysis, this Part will show 
how key market players currently comply with COPPA regulation, and 
it will evaluate whether such compliance is relevant to IoToys’s dangers 
and challenges. Part IV revisits COPPA, challenges it, and in calling 
for its recalibration, offers some practical solutions to IoToys’s privacy 
threats. Thereafter, Part V normatively evaluates children’s conception 
of privacy, argues that IoToys’s monitoring practices could jeopardize 
the parent–child relationship, and calls for recalibrating children’s
privacy in the digital era. The final part summarizes the discussion and 
concludes that children’s privacy matters today perhaps more than ever 
before and that the potential movement toward a ubiquitous 
surveillance era should not lead to its demise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Children’s toys are more communicative now than ever before. 
Implementing the advantages of what is commonly termed the Internet of 
Things (IoT),1 many toy conglomerates have begun to produce and sell 
connected so-called smart toys, namely toys that can listen and actively respond 
to their users in real time. Being triggered, usually via a voice command, these 
toys will then send the message to a remote server, analyze it, and issue a timely 
response through the toy, as if it were talking to the child.2
Developments in this relatively new Internet of Toys (IoToys) market are 
advancing apace. At first, communicative toys were fairly limited in their 
communication abilities,3 but now this expanding market offers various types 
of child-targeted toys and other devices that are both smart and connected to the 
internet.4 Many are now equipped with microphones, speakers, cameras, and 
GPS trackers, along with other sensors designed to improve the toy’s abilities,
and ultimately the child’s experience.5
IoToys devices sound almost like every child’s dream. But while many 
benefits might accrue from their use, they may also quickly turn into 
nightmares.6 Generally these toys, along with the cloud in which the gathered
data is stored, could be hacked or accessed by third parties, thus exposing 
children to harmful content, and worse—endangering their personal safety and 
mental health.7 More closely—and within the scope of this Article—children
are also subjected to ubiquitous surveillance and datafication by toy 
conglomerates and their trusted partners, unauthorized third parties like hackers, 
and even their parents.8 In other words, these seemingly harmless toys could 
                                                                                                                     
1 The term Internet of Things may have been coined by Kevin Ashton as a part of a 
presentation for Proctor & Gamble. See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID 
J. (June 22, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/pdf?4986 [https://perma.cc/BY6Z-
V2HM]. For more on the development of IoT, see Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters 
Attack: A Polycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV.
415, 421–24 (2017).
2 See discussion infra Part II.A.
3 See, e.g., Victoria Dawson, The Epic Failure of Thomas Edison’s Talking Doll,
SMITHSONIAN (June 1, 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/epic
-failure-thomas-edisons-talking-doll-180955442 [https://perma.cc/VP3S-JEHB].
4 See FUTURE OF PRIVACY F. & FAMILY ONLINE SAFETY INST., KIDS & THE CONNECTED 
HOME: PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF CONNECTED DOLLS, TALKING DINOSAURS, AND BATTLING 
ROBOTS 2 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter KIDS & THE CONNECTED HOME], available at
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Kids-The-Connected-Home-Privacy-in-the-
Age-of-Connected-Dolls-Talking-Dinosaurs-and-Battling-Robots.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QV8P-U53U].
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra note 48.
7 See infra Part IV.B.4.
8 This Article will use the term “parents” in reference to legal guardianship for minors 
in general. Subsequently, the use of the term “surveillance” will refer to various facets of 
monitoring and datafication of children’s data within the Internet of Toys (IoToys). This type 
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potentially generate substantial harm, and perhaps worst of all, endanger 
children’s right to privacy.
Potential datafication and misuse of children’s data troubled policymakers 
long before the emergence of IoToys. Recognizing the potential dangers of the 
internet to children’s privacy, American policymakers designed a framework 
known as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) regulation, 
which applies to websites that target or knowingly collect personal information 
from children under age thirteen.9 COPPA regulation was devised long before 
the invention of IoT,10 but it remains the current regulatory framework 
governing IoToys. Do fundamental differences between websites and IoToys 
necessitate a different legal framework to protect children’s privacy? Should 
policymakers recalibrate the current legal framework to adequately protect the 
privacy of children who have IoToys devices? And if so, how should it be done? 
Finally, what are the consequences for children’s privacy of ubiquitous parental 
surveillance through IoToys—allegedly granted to safeguard children from 
online risks—and how might children’s privacy be better framed and protected 
in this context?
This Article approaches these and related questions by analyzing the current 
legal framework fashioned twenty years ago to protect young children’s privacy 
online and by examining—practically and normatively—how applicable it is to 
IoToys. Part II briefly introduces the evolution of IoToys and further examines 
the datafication of children within it. Part III scrutinizes children’s right to 
privacy at the federal level as to whether COPPA regulation is applicable to 
IoToys. Then Part IV reevaluates children’s privacy within the IoToys legal 
framework and proposes to recalibrate it in keeping with COPPA’s
requirements. Part V zooms out to discuss how children’s privacy is affected by 
IoToys from the perspective of the parent–child relationship. It argues that 
children’s privacy should not be viewed as protection just from third parties but 
also from their parents. Part VI summarizes the discussion and concludes that 
children’s privacy is of profound importance, especially given a potential 
movement toward a ubiquitous surveillance era.
                                                                                                                     
of surveillance could also refer to “dataveillance”—an abbreviation of data surveillance—
described by Roger Clarke as “the systematic use of personal data systems in the 
investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons.” Roger 
Clarke, The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data Surveillance, in 3 THE LIBRARY OF 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND PRIVACY: SECURITY AND PRIVACY 19, 25 (Joseph Savirimuthu ed., 
2015).
9 See infra Part III.A.
10 See infra Part III.A.
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II. THE INTERNET OF TOYS
Toys have existed almost as long as humanity itself. According to 
archaeologists, they date back at least four millennia.11 While adults might 
occasionally play with them, traditional toys appeal mostly to children of 
various ages. But the meaning of traditional in the toy realm can change swiftly, 
considering technological innovations. Through the application of advanced 
learning capabilities and connection to the internet, many toys have become 
more interactive than ever before in human history12 and most likely will 
continue to evolve for years to come.
Aside from their enjoyment and other potential educational and social 
benefits,13 IoToys might also have a dark side. Along with IoToys devices’
datamining capabilities, they could be exploited by various entities and 
eventually harm children and violate their legal rights.14 For a better 
understanding of these concerns, Part II.A briefly tells the story of how toys 
became interactive from the first talking doll in 1890 to the latest technological 
developments of IoToys. The second section exposes and evaluates the potential 
dangers that IoToys raises in general and reviews the datamining practices of 
key market players in the IoToys industry to prepare the way for evaluating 
IoToys’s implications for children’s privacy.
A. The Evolution of Connected Smart Toys
In 1890, Thomas Edison introduced the first-ever talking doll to the world.15
Edison inserted a miniature model of his phonograph into a doll’s chest, which 
enabled it to recite a twenty-second rendition of a well-known rhyme.16
Humanity, though, did not care for Edison’s invention at that time, as the toy 
proved a commercial failure.17 However, the importance of Edison’s first-ever 
communicative toy lay mainly in its innovative thinking: it marked the potential 
birth of a new market, namely toys that could interact with children.
                                                                                                                     
11 See Amber Williams, FYI: What Is the Oldest Toy in the World?, POPULAR SCI. (Feb. 
16, 2012), https://www.popsci.com/science/article/2012-01/what-oldest-toy-world 
[https://perma.cc/9SHH-8NWA].
12 See, e.g., Katie Lobosco, Talking Barbie Is Too ‘Creepy’ for Some Parents, CNN
BUS. (Mar. 12, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/11/news/companies/creepy-hello-
barbie [https://perma.cc/2WX4-FW2X].
13 See infra Part II.A.
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 Dawson, supra note 3. Edison’s idea for commercializing his phonograph through 
dolls could be traced to a notebook entry in 1877. See James Vlahos, Barbie Wants to Get
to Know Your Child, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/
magazine/barbie-wants-to-get-to-know-your-child.html [on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal].
16 See Dawson, supra note 3.
17 Id.
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A market demand for interactive toys can be traced back to the early 
1960s.18 One of the key examples of this then-new market is pull-string dolls 
like Mattel’s Chatty Cathy.19 Only then did the market begin to thrive. Not long 
after Chatty Cathy’s commercial success, Mattel introduced other 
communicative toys like See ’n Say.20 Years later, other toy manufacturers 
followed suit by introducing communicative toys like Teddy Ruxpin and 
Furby.21 Technology inspired life in toys, as they could now talk to children. At 
this stage, toys’ abilities were still quite limited. Prior to the development of 
IoT, when ordinary objects became connected to the internet, toys’
communication was still almost entirely one-sided. Even the most 
communicative toys had tightly limited storage capacity and learning 
capabilities, and they could not transfer data beyond their physical space, let 
alone analyze it and respond to their users.
With the development of IoT, and along with various devices targeted at 
children,22 toys became more sophisticated or—stated differently—smarter. 
They began not only to repeat predefined phrases or well-known rhymes, but 
also to listen and respond. These smart toys interact with their users through an 
array of electronic features such as microphones, speakers, sensors, cameras, 
gyroscopes, and radio transmitters.23 Besides smart toys, another form of new 
toys emerged, capable of connecting to an external network, mostly the internet,
via a Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) connection, cellular data networks, or 
Bluetooth.24 These connected toys are designed to connect to the internet or 
                                                                                                                     
18 See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, The 13 Most Influential Toys of All Time, TIME (Oct. 
29, 2014), http://time.com/3089384/influential-toys [https://perma.cc/P8PD-WQS9] (listing 
interactive toys that began being sold in the 1960s).
19 See SHARON M. SCOTT, TOYS AND AMERICAN CULTURE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 60–61 
(2010).
20 See Allie Townsend, See ’n Say, TIME (Feb. 16, 2011), http://content.time.com/time
/specials/packages/article/0288042049243_2048656_2049201,00.html [https://perma.cc/8
64R-D5TK].
21 Teddy Ruxpin is a “talking” bear whose mouth and ears move while “reading” stories 
from an audio tape cassette. See Bridget Carey, The Life, Death and Resurrection of Teddy 
Ruxpin, CNET (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/features/teddy-ruxpin-history-
disney-atari-2017-return [https://perma.cc/5VEJ-T86W]. Furby is a toy first released in 1998 
by Tiger Electronics Inc. that had the ability to “learn English.” Furby (1998), OFFICIAL
FURBY WIKI, http://official-furby.wikia.com/wiki/Furby_(1998) [https://perma.cc/N23R-
TS2Y].
22 These devices include, inter alia, children’s wearables, smartphones, and tablets. See, 
e.g., Desire Athow, Best Kids Tablets 2017: The Top Slates for Children, TECHRADAR (Dec. 
7, 2016), http://www.techradar.com/news/best-kids-tablets-2016-the-top-slates-for-children 
[https://perma.cc/CMH8-FS8E].
23 See KIDS & THE CONNECTED HOME, supra note 4. It is notable that the use of the 
word “smart” to describe various types of devices and toys might be perceived as somewhat 
inaccurate to describe their true functions. Nevertheless, I generally use this term in this 
Article as it is often used by many to describe these devices and toys.
24 Id. at 3–4.
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other devices in order to receive and transmit data.25 The combination of these 
two innovations led to the formation of connected smart toys, or more simply 
stated, IoToys. These toys could interact meaningfully with their users, hence 
they could be attractive to anyone, not just children. IoToys marked the birth of 
two-way communication toys.
Realizing a potential demand for IoToys devices, before long the market 
reacted. In 2015, Mattel collaborated with ToyTalk (later rebranded as 
PullString, Inc.) to introduce a Barbie doll that “actually listen[s] and talk[s]
back.”26 Using speech recognition, Hello Barbie connects to the internet via Wi-
Fi, and by the press of a buckle button on its belt, Hello Barbie turns its 
microphone on and begins recording.27 The data is then sent from the doll to a 
cloud-based service of ToyTalk, and following analysis, a response is streamed 
back to the user through the doll’s speaker.28
Hello Barbie clearly marked the beginning of a thriving new market.29 To 
name a few examples, following Hello Barbie, Mattel introduced the Hello 
Barbie Dreamhouse (hereinafter The Dreamhouse), a smart connected home for 
Barbie dolls;30 Fisher-Price, a subsidiary of Mattel, introduced a Wi-Fi-
connected smart toy bear that “talks, listens, and ‘remembers’ what your child 
says and even responds when spoken to”;31 CogniToys introduced various 
                                                                                                                     
25 Smart toys and connected toys are not necessarily synonymous. The fact that a toy is 
smart does not mean it is connected, nor the other way around. Smart toys could be offline 
and connected toys might not be equipped with technological capabilities to elevate them to 
the level of being categorized as “smart.” For more on smart and connected toys, see id. at 
2.
26 Lobosco, supra note 12.
27 See Iain Thomson, Hello Barbie: Hang on, This Wi-Fi Doll Records Your Child’s
Voice?, THE REGISTER (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/19/hello_bar
bie [https://perma.cc/4HS4-WX4D].
28 See Lobosco, supra note 12; Joseph Steinberg, This New Toy Records Your 
Children’s Private Moments -- Buyer Beware, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2015/03/20/this-new-toy-records-your-
childrens-private-moments-buyer-beware/#2d7698951ab9 [https://perma.cc/ZK9E-UJYT].
29 It seems that it will not take long before market players expand their variety of IoToys 
devices and new companies will join this growing market. Google, for instance, has filed a 
patent request back in 2015 for a teddy bear outfitted with sensors and cameras. See Hope 
King, Google Files Patent for Creepy Teddy Bear, CNN (May 22, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/22/technology/google-doll-toy-connected-device-patent 
[https://perma.cc/PG24-ZGGL]; Press Release, Juniper Res., Smart Toy Revenues to Hit 
$2.8BN This Year, Driven by Black Friday & Christmas Holiday Sales (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://www.juniperresearch.com/press/press-releases/smart-toy-revenues-to-hit-$2-8bn-
this-year [https://perma.cc/8CK5-LJUT].
30 See Barbie® Hello Dreamhouse, BARBIE, https://barbie.mattel.com/en-
us/about/hello-dreamhouse.html [https://perma.cc/U2H5-G8HQ].
31 Duncan Riley, There’s a Hacker in There: Security Vulnerabilities Found in Fisher 
Price, hereO GPS Kids Toys, SILICON ANGLE (Feb. 2, 2016), https://siliconangle.com/2016
/02/02/theres-a-hacker-in-there-security-vulnerabilities-found-in-fisher-price-hereo-gps-
kids-toys/ [https://perma.cc/4QZN-SEB7]. See generally Smart Toy® Bear, FISHER-PRICE,
http://fisherprice.mattel.com/shop/Product2_10151_10101_18442_-1 [https://perma.cc/
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cloud-connected toy dinosaurs that listen to children’s questions and answer 
according to their age;32 and Genesis, a company incorporated under the laws 
of Hong Kong, introduced My Friend Cayla (hereinafter Cayla), a doll that 
could talk and interact with users, play games, share photos, and read stories.33
This market appears to be growing continuously.34
The children’s IoT market has recently expanded beyond toys. This 
expansion was first proclaimed early in 2017, when Mattel, under its “Nabi”
brand, announced its plan to manufacture a smart Wi-Fi-connected speaker for 
children.35 This device, named Aristotle, was supposed to be equipped with a 
microphone, LEDs, and a camera,36 and it was designed to act like a
computerized personal assistant akin to Amazon Echo or Google Home,37
                                                                                                                     
4CVZ-3QGJ] (describing the current range of toys).
32 See Part Toy. Part Pal. All Awesome., COGNITOYS, https://cognitoys.com/pages/
about [https://perma.cc/W8ZX-TKRV].
33 Upon downloading the App, users can ask Cayla questions which will be answered 
by “Internet sources” like Google Search, Wikipedia, and Weather Underground. See 
Privacy Policy, MY FRIEND CAYLA, https://www.myfriendcayla.com/privacy-policy (last 
updated Feb. 23, 2015) [https://perma.cc/CNL8-A4NQ]; This Is Cayla, MY FRIEND CAYLA,
https://www.myfriendcayla.com/meet-cayla-c8hw [https://perma.cc/DLY2-E6WG].
34 For a prediction on the future of IoToys, see, for example, Global Smart Toys Market 
Will Reach USD 5,410.00 Million by 2024: Zion Market Research, GLOBENEWSWIRE (Sept. 
5, 2018), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/09/05/1565750/0/en/Global-Smart-
Toys-Market-Will-Reach-USD-5-410-00-Million-By-2024-Zion-Market-Research.html 
[https://perma.cc/V9CF-436T].
35 See Rob Verger, Mattel Touts Aristotle, an Amazon Echo-Style Device for Children,
FOX NEWS (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2017/01/04/mattel-touts-aristotle-
amazon-echo-style-device-for-children.html [https://perma.cc/4SH5-VJEN].
36 See id.
37 Computerized personal assistants (also known as intelligent personal assistants) are 
software agents that can perform tasks or services for an individual, usually based on user 
input, location awareness, and the ability to access information from a variety of online 
sources. There are various types of computerized personal assistants, e.g., Apple’s Siri and 
Microsoft’s Cortana. Google had even embedded such technology in 2014, under a pre-
installed ability in Google’s Chrome browser that passively listened for the words “OK, 
Google” to launch a voice-activated search function. See Tony Bradley, ‘OK Google’
Feature Removed from Chrome Browser, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/tonybradley/2015/10/17/ok-google-feature-removed-from-chrome-browser/#16d299a
44e27 [https://perma.cc/Y9TZ-9JU3]; Top 22 Intelligent Personal Assistants or Automated 
Personal Assistants, PAT RES., http://www.predictiveanalyticstoday.com/top-intelligent-
personal-assistants-automated-personal-assistants/#content-anchor [https://perma.cc/DQ9Z
-FW3M]. More specifically, Amazon Echo is “a hands-free speaker you control with your 
voice.” Amazon Echo, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Echo-Bluetooth-
Speaker-with-WiFi-Alexa/dp/B00X4WHP5E [https://perma.cc/C6XL-KZZQ]. It “connects 
to the Alexa Voice Service to play music, . . . provide information, news, sports scores, 
weather, and more—instantly. . . . When you want to use Echo, just say the wake word 
‘Alexa’ and Echo responds instantly.” Id. Google Home is a voice-activated speaker powered 
by the Google Assistant. “Ask [it] questions. Tell it to do things. It’s your own Google, 
always ready to help.” Google Home Devices, GOOGLE HOME HELP,
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programmed for children’s purposes.38 As for now, Mattel decided that Aristotle 
is not fit for release, and its future is still uncertain.39 Mattel, however, currently 
still plans to release the Hello Barbie Hologram (hereinafter The Hologram): 
a small box with an animated projection of Barbie that responds to voice 
commands.40 Closely akin to computerized personal assistants like Amazon 
Echo or Google Home, the Hologram uses a wake phrase (“Hello Barbie”), so 
unlike Hello Barbie, this device operates in an “always on” mode: for the device 
to begin functioning, it must constantly listen for the wake phrase.41
Respectively, Amazon had already entered this market recently, introducing the 
Echo Dot “Kids Edition”—a standard Echo Dot with “parental controls, kid-
friendly content, and an optimized experience for kids.”42 All in all, as could be 
drawn from these innovative projections of new devices, IoT will most likely 
play a substantive role in child-targeted devices in the foreseeable future.
IoToys presents children with interactive playing. Beyond the toys’ fun,
they could carry educational and social benefits for children: opportunities to 
learn, pick up, and improve communication skills; retain interest in playing 
despite children’s short attention spans; encourage active play and toy 
interaction, which might be preferable to passive screen time; foster 
collaborative play with other children; identify learning difficulties or medical 
problems; and be economically efficient for parents because their software 
could be updated.43 On the other hand, IoToys devices have been criticized for 
                                                                                                                     
https://support.google.com/googlehome/answer/7029281?hl=en [https://perma.cc/5WFY-
NYKU].
38 See Verger, supra note 35. Another potential smart assistant for children is “Smarty,”
which, according to its manufacturer, is equivalent to an Amazon Echo for children. See Zoë 
Corbyn, The Future of Smart Toys and the Battle for Digital Children, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 
22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/22/digital-children-smart-
toys-technology [https://perma.cc/DEH4-8EA5].
39 See Eric Franklin, Mattel Won’t Release Its Aristotle Child Monitor After All, CNET
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/mattel-just-cancelled-its-aristotle-child-monitor 
[https://perma.cc/Q2DP-MM49].
40 See Tim Moynihan, So, Barbie’s a Hologram Now. Oh, and She Responds to Your 
Voice, WIRED (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/hello-barbie-hologram-
matell [https://perma.cc/L3GC-8Z9X].
41 An “always on” mode refers to devices where there is no need to physically push a 
button to turn them on, but rather they are activated by a voice command or through the 
device app. Using speech recognition, users simply need to say a trigger phrase to activate 
them. Examples include Amazon Echo and Google Home, both activated by a trigger phrase 
such as “Alexa” or “OK Google” respectively, and once activated record the voice command 
of their user. See sources cited supra note 37.
42 Dan Seifert, Amazon’s New Echo Dot Kids Edition Comes with a Colorful Case and 
Parental Controls, THE VERGE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/25/1727
6164/amazon-echo-dot-kids-edition-freetime-price-announcement-features-specs 
[https://perma.cc/73CA-6DAX].
43 See Stéphane Chaudron et al., Kaleidoscope on the Internet of Toys: Safety, Security, 
Privacy and Societal Insights, JRC TECHNICAL REP. 9 (2017), http://publications.jrc.ec.eur
opa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC105061/jrc105061_final_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CV
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their potential educational, social, and psychological drawbacks.44 To name a 
few: providing poor quality of play; potentially harming children’s
development, impeding child–parent interaction;45 obstructing children’s well-
being and healthy development, which require real relationships and 
conversations;46 and posing a risk to health from electromagnetic radiation 
(EMR).47
IoToys devices’ potential drawbacks do not stop there. They might subject 
children to various risks, for example, exposure to harmful content.48 There is 
even the danger of mental and bodily harm by predators, some of whom could 
have access toys and use them to listen to, watch, track, and even directly contact 
children.49 Along with these important challenges, these IoToys devices further 
raise human rights concerns. Potentially, they can subject children to ubiquitous 
surveillance and datafication, which could profoundly impact their right to 
privacy.50 To normatively assess the privacy challenges—which is the core 
                                                                                                                     
A-B3FY]; 5 Benefits of Tech Toys for Children, ROBO WUNDERKIND (June 23, 2017), 
http://yuriy-levin.squarespace.com/blog/benefits-tech-toys-kids [https://perma.cc/Q599-
U3A8].
44 See Kate Cox, Privacy Advocates Raise Concerns About Mattel’s Always-On 
‘Aristotle’ Baby Monitor, CONSUMERIST (May 10, 2017), https://consumerist.com/2017/05/
10/privacy-advocates-raise-concerns-about-mattels-always-on-aristotle-baby-monitor 
[https://perma.cc/VP3S-JEHB].
45 Digital caretaking could negatively affect children’s development as it lacks 
necessary physical bonding. See id.
46 See, e.g., Richard Chirgwin, Mattel’s Parenting Takeover Continues with Alexa-Like
Dystopia, THE REGISTER (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/01/04/mattels
_parenting_takeover_continues_with_alexalike_dystopia [https://perma.cc/NXP5-7GW3].
47 See Chaudron et al., supra note 43, at 9.
48 As these toys rely on remotely stored data, they could be subjected to harmful content 
as information might become vulnerable and could be changed by a malicious entity which 
gained access to the toy or simply due to bad or error in programing. See, for instance, how 
a misunderstanding led Amazon Echo to spout porn search terms to a toddler. Amazon Alexa 
Gone Wild, YOUTUBE (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5p0gqCIEa8 
[https://perma.cc/SE3G-M5ZU]. See also how a specialist team hacked Cayla to quote 
Hannibal Lecter and lines from 50 Shades of Grey. See David Moye, Talking Doll Cayla 
Hacked to Spew Filthy Things, HUFFPOST (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/02/09/my-friend-cayla-hacked_n_6647046.html [https://perma.cc/78HN-89F6].
49 When children assume that it is the toy that is “talking” to them, predators might be 
able to persuade them to convey sensitive information. These predators could obtain 
information from children like where they live and, perhaps even worse, convince them to 
act on their behalf. See Abby Haglage, Hackable ‘Hello Barbie’ the Worst Toy of the Year 
(and Maybe Ever), DAILY BEAST (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/hackable-
hello-barbie-the-worst-toy-of-the-year-and-maybe-ever [https://perma.cc/85E4-AGQW]. 
For a typology of risks to children online, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
(OECD), THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN ONLINE - RECOMMENDATION OF THE OECD
COUNCIL REPORT ON RISKS FACED BY CHILDREN ONLINE AND POLICIES TO PROTECT THEM
24–39 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/childrenonline_with_cover.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33T7-R645].
50 For more on children’s right to privacy, see infra Part III.A.
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purpose of this Article—the next section briefly surveys the proclaimed 
datamining practices of key market players in the IoToys realm.
B. Surveillance and Datafication of Children in IoToys
While toys have evolved to become smarter and connected, the various 
IoToys devices may evince wide differences.51 Some are smarter than others. 
Some are equipped with more technological tools that enhance their capabilities; 
others are simply more sophisticated, for example, by being equipped with a 
microphone, while others have cameras and other sensors. Some, like Hello 
Barbie, require their users to turn them on manually,52 while others, like the 
Dreamhouse and the Hologram, operate in an “always on” mode, namely by
constantly operating as they await their wake phrase.53 Yet their different 
characteristics notwithstanding, the core functions of IoToys devices are fairly 
similar: upon activation, each toy acquires data from its user, sends it to a remote 
server where it is analyzed, and transmits a response through the toy’s speaker. 
Datamining is essentially at the core of their functioning.
Take, for example, Mattel, which manufactures several types of IoToys and 
connected smart devices such as Hello Barbie (doll and hologram) and the 
Dreamhouse. The speech processing services for Hello Barbie and the 
Dreamhouse (hereinafter Barbie Products) are currently operated by ToyTalk.54
Barbie Products capture recordings upon users’ interaction with them, whether 
by pressing the “talk” button or saying the wake phrase.55 Other products, like 
Cayla, also capture their users’ recording, usually after a wake phrase.56 Fisher-
Price’s Smart Toy bear collects a parent’s email address and login password; 
child’s first name, birthdate, and gender; toy name and identifier; Wi-Fi 
password; and mobile device information.57 Essentially, most of these IoToys
devices capture audio recordings and collect some forms of data.
The information mined through these toys is then stored, usually in the 
cloud, for various purposes.58 Obviously, data can be highly valuable for various 
                                                                                                                     
51 For an analysis of how IoToys devices operate, see Junia Valente & Alvaro A. 
Cardenas, Security & Privacy in Smart Toys, IOTS&P’17, 19 (2017).
52 Thomson, supra note 27.
53 See Moynihan, supra note 40.
54 See Privacy Policy, TOYTALK, https://www.toytalk.com/hellobarbie/privacy 
[https://perma.cc/D8V5-UBQA] [hereinafter TOYTALK, Privacy].
55 See id. (“When children or other users talk with Hello Barbie by pressing and holding 
the ‘Talk’ button, interact with Barbie Hello Dreamhouse after saying the Gate Phrase, or 
record their voice to customize the sounds in a room, we may capture voice recordings.”).
56 Privacy Policy, supra note 33; This Is Cayla, supra note 33.
57 MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., 114TH CONG., REP.
ON CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS: DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS 12 (Comm. 
Print 2016) [hereinafter CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS]. Images and audio, however, are 
currently only stored locally on the bear. Id.
58 ToyTalk and Genesis both mention that they store voice recordings in the cloud. 
ToyTalk announced that they may “use, store, process, convert, transcribe, analyze or review 
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interested parties for a variety of business purposes, much like any data gathered 
online.59 Data can potentially be commercialized and shared with other 
interested parties.60 From a functional aspect, data could be valuable for the 
toy’s improvement. As some toy manufacturers and online service providers 
(OSPs) posit, the entertainment experience from the toy is based to some extent 
on the audio recordings sent from it, which are then analyzed and stored.61
Improving the functioning of the speech-processing services is essential, as is 
the development, testing, and improvement of speech-recognition technology 
and artificial-intelligence algorithms;62 likewise the development of acoustic 
and language models.63 It might also be necessary for other research, 
development, and data analysis purposes.64 Finally, in the sense of innovation, 
companies might need the data to ameliorate services, functionality, and the 
development of other toys and devices in the IoT market.
To recap briefly, while it is difficult to assess how and to what extent the 
collected data is used, and by whom, these companies evidently are able to 
capture various types of data. Toys with microphones could allow listening to 
and recording any conversations taking place in relatively close proximity to the 
toys. Toys equipped with sensors could give third parties access to data in real-
time from these sensors. Toys with GPS trackers let third parties know where 
the toys are currently located and where they have been since they were first 
                                                                                                                     
voice recordings.” See, e.g., TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54. As for the Hologram, 
however, Mattel announced that it does not save the recordings in its servers. See Moynihan, 
supra note 40.
59 See, e.g., Grace Chung & Sara M. Grimes, Data Mining the Kids: Surveillance and 
Market Research Strategies in Children’s Online Games, 30 CAN. J. COMM. 527, 533 (2005).
60 Genesis, for instance, mentions that upon consent, they are entitled to collect, 
process, maintain, and transfer personal information in and to the United States and other 
applicable territories in which their privacy laws are not as comprehensive as or equivalent 
to those in the country where the data subject resides or is a national. They also share 
information with “trusted partners” and other entities in the “family of companies controlled 
by Genesis” for internal reasons, primarily for business and operational purposes. See 
Privacy Policy, supra note 33. ToyTalk shares captured data with third parties under 
exception listed in the privacy policy. Interestingly, however, ToyTalk claims that they will 
not share voice recordings with Mattel, rather only anonymized information that does not 
count as personal information. See TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54; Hello Barbie and 
Hello Dreamhouse Privacy FAQ, TOYTALK, https://toytalk.com/hellobarbie/privacyfaq 
[https://perma.cc/57MY-4ZAA] [hereinafter TOYTALK, FAQ].
61 ToyTalk claims that they use audio recordings to create the entertainment experience. 
According to Martin Reddy, a chief technical officer at ToyTalk, analyzing recordings 
enables ToyTalk to boost the accuracy of what Hello Barbie hears by about 15%. See Mark 
Harris, Virtual Assistants such as Amazon’s Echo Break US Child Privacy Law, Experts Say,
THE GUARDIAN (May 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology2016/may/26/am
azon-echo-virtual-assistant-child-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/EKT5-DN93]. It should also 
be further noted that ToyTalk archives users’ play sessions. See TOYTALK, FAQ, supra note 
60.
62 See TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54; Privacy Policy, supra note 33.
63 See TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54.
64 Id.
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configured. And finally, toys equipped with cameras could enable third parties 
to see what the toys are currently seeing. These companies can then store the
data for indefinite periods, use it for their own purposes, and share it with 
interested parties. 
While children’s datafication in IoToys might be integral for the toys’
existence and development, it also raises substantial privacy concerns. How can 
we properly safeguard the data aggregated through IoToys from authorized and 
unauthorized entities that have gained access to the data? Does the current 
American legal framework65—originally crafted to protect children online—
apply to IoToys? And does it adequately protect their right to privacy? To 
answer these questions, the next Part revisits and evaluates children’s right to 
privacy in light of IoToys.
III. REGULATING PRIVACY WITHIN THE INTERNET OF TOYS
It is generally uncontested that children require special care and 
assistance.66 As a cohort, they are less equipped with the skills and cognitive 
ability to comprehend some risks and concerns as adults do, let alone the depth 
and complexity of human rights and liberties.67 They might lack the requisite 
“maturity, [ability,] knowledge, or experience to protect themselves,”68 and they 
could be more trusting than adults.69 They might value their immediate needs 
more than their long-term interests,70 not understand the true nature or 
appropriate use of the collected information,71 and value privacy differently 
from their parents.72 In other words, while accounting for potential age 
                                                                                                                     
65 This Article focuses on the federal level, but it is also important to note that state 
legislators also enact privacy laws which could be applicable on IoToys as well. For more 
on states’ privacy legislation, see, for example, DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 145–56 (Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Professionals ed., 2015).
66 Many consider childhood to be entitled to special care and assistance. On the global 
level, see G.A. Res. 44/25, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 
1989). For a detailed report on online risks to children, see INTERNET SAFETY TECH. TASK 
FORCE TO THE MULTI-STATE WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL NETWORKING OF STATE ATTORNEYS 
GEN. OF THE U.S., ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES (John Palfrey et 
al. eds., 2008).
67 See Nicholas W. Allard, Privacy On-Line: Washington Report, 20 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 511, 529 (1998).
68 Danielle J. Garber, COPPA: Protecting Children’s Personal Information on the 
Internet, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 129, 132 (2001).
69 Dorothy A. Hertzel, Note, Don’t Talk to Strangers: An Analysis of Government and 
Industry Efforts to Protect a Child’s Privacy Online, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 429, 434 (2000).
70 Emmanuelle Bartoli, Children’s Data Protection vs Marketing Companies, 23 INT’L
REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 35, 37 (2009).
71 See Jerry S. Birenz, Caching World Wide Web Sites, 16 COMM. LAW. 13, 13 (1998);
Hertzel, supra note 69, at 434.
72 See Emily Nussbaum, My So-Called Blog, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/magazine/my-so-called-blog.html [on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal]. For more on children’s perception of privacy, see infra Part V.B.
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differences, children often need guidance on various aspects of their lives, 
including how to properly protect their privacy.
A. Children’s Right to Privacy
There are many different views on what privacy means and how best to 
protect it.73 The modern concept of privacy is generally attributed to the famous 
law review article by attorneys Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis, published in the same year that Edison introduced the 
first-ever talking doll, which articulated the right to privacy as the “right to be 
let alone.”74 Since then, privacy scholars have articulated the right to privacy 
diversely. Key examples include the classic “control theory,” which 
conceptualizes privacy as the right to control information about oneself;75
“limited access theory,” which posits that privacy is related to our concern about 
our accessibility to others;76 and a conceptual framework of privacy as 
“contextual integrity,” which links the protection of personal information to the 
norms of specific contexts.77 Without belittling the importance of this scholarly 
debate, privacy in the context of this Article is scrutinized from the viewpoint 
of children, who require special protection from the harm that the internet
entails, under the American approach known as “sectoral privacy.”78
American policymakers chose this sectoral approach to privacy, seeking to 
provide legal safeguards that would presumably improve children’s safety 
                                                                                                                     
73 For a taxonomy of privacy, see Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 477, 484–91 (2006).
74 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890).
75 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1968) (“[T]he claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.”).
76 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980). See 
generally ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY (1988)
(introducing a range of privacy and privacy-related problems confronting American women).
77 See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (detailing privacy considerations relevant in the 
context of rapidly developing technology).
78 Sectoral privacy can be loosely defined as regulation that is directed to specific 
industries or a cohort (like children) and depends also on types of information. Generally, 
data privacy protection in the American legal system is protected under this sectorial 
approach, i.e., by specific targeted rules. Beyond the data protection of young children 
through COPPA, see generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a–1681x (2012) 
and Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (regulating financial 
information); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. 
L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (regulating healthcare and medical information);
Video Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100–618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710–2712 (2012)) (protecting individuals’ videotape rental 
information); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
877 (2003).
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online and reasonably secure their privacy.79 In 1998, under this perceived need 
to protect children’s privacy online,80 Congress enacted the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).81 To supplement COPPA, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) issued a rule, last updated in 2013, which is commonly 
referred to as the “COPPA Rule.”82 Both forms of regulation (hereinafter 
COPPA regulation) were crafted to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in connection with personal information from and about children on the internet;
it is enforced by the FTC.83
                                                                                                                     
79 See The Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681–736 
(1998). Information privacy was defined by the Clinton Administration’s Information 
Infrastructure Task Force as “an individual’s claim to control the terms under which personal 
information—information identifiable to the individual—is acquired, disclosed, and used.”
INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION 1
(1995). The conventional concept of information privacy refers to protecting a right to 
control one’s personal data. For further reading on information privacy, see generally Joel 
R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000) (exploring the divergence in internet privacy approach and 
substance between Europe and the United States).
80 It is worth mentioning that Congress also sought to regulate the exposure of children 
to inappropriate materials online by enacting the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), but 
it eventually failed to pass constitutional muster as it placed an “impermissible burden” on
speech. See The Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681–736 
(1998); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166–69 (3d Cir. 2000).
81 It should be stressed that COPPA was passed following dozens of rejected privacy 
bills. In addition, prior to COPPA, Congress enacted the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) in 1974, which also regulates children’s informational privacy and 
family privacy. FERPA, however, applies only on the release of educational records to 
unauthorized persons by educational institutions. See The Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 93–380 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)); 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 3 U.S. DEP’T EDU., 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html [https://perma.cc/XN5A-K4J2]; 
see also Kathryn C. Montgomery & Jeff Chester, Data Protection for Youth in the Digital 
Age: Developing a Rights-Based Global Framework, 1 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 277, 279–
80 (2015) (discussing the key factors that shaped COPPA and explaining its legacy for the 
digital children’s marketplace and U.S. regulation).
82 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888 (Nov. 3, 1999) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2012)) [hereinafter COPPA Rule]. COPPA Rule has been
effective since April 2000. For the latest update, see 78 Fed. Reg. 3972 (Jan. 17, 2013).
83 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2012); COPPA Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888 (Nov. 3, 1999) 
(codified at 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2012)); Garber, supra note 69, at 153. 
An ‘unfair or deceptive’ act or practice is a material ‘representation, omission or 
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, 
to the consumer’s detriment’ or a practice that ‘causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and 
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.’ 
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 599 (2014) (internal citations omitted). Substantial injury, in this 
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COPPA regulation applies to OSPs that target children under the age of
thirteen84 or knowingly collect personal information from them.85 An OSP is 
any person operating an online service, including websites, “who collects or 
maintains personal information from or about the users of, or visitors to,” such 
online services.86 It also includes any person “on whose behalf such information 
is collected or maintained, where such a website or online service is operated 
for commercial purposes, including any person offering products or services for 
sale through that website or online service, involving commerce.”87
As a form of market self-regulation—commonly termed privacy self-
management,88 COPPA incorporates five essential Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs):89 (1) Notice, (2) Choice, (3) Access, (4) Security, and (5) 
Enforcement.90 Websites that fall under COPPA regulation must include a 
                                                                                                                     
instance, could apply on both financial harms and unwarranted health and safety risks. See
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at ¶ 12, FTC v. Information Search, 
Inc., No. 06CV01099, 2006 WL 1882455 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2007) (“The invasion of privacy 
and security resulting from obtaining and selling confidential customer phone records 
without the consumers’ authorization causes substantial harm to consumers and the public, 
including, but not limited to, endangering the health and safety of consumers.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45 (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition unlawful”).
84 While arguably, choosing the age of thirteen is somewhat arbitrary, it is beyond this 
Article’s scope to examine this controversy. For such criticism, see, for example, Bartoli, 
supra note 70, at 38.
85 Id.
Personal information means individually identifiable information about an individual 
collected online, including: (1) A first and last name; (2) A home or other physical 
address including street name and name of a city or town; (3) Online contact 
information as defined in this section; (4) A screen or user name where it functions in 
the same manner as online contact information, as defined in this section; (5) A 
telephone number; (6) A Social Security number; (7) A persistent identifier that can be 
used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services. . . . ;
(8) A photograph, video, or audio file where such file contains a child’s image or voice; 
(9) Geolocation information sufficient to identify street name and name of a city or 
town; or (10) Information concerning the child or [parent] that the operator collects 
online from the child and combines with an identifier described in this definition.
16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2012); see 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2012).
86 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2) (2012).
87 Id.
88 Privacy self-management is an approach to privacy regulation whereas the law 
provides people with a set of rights, e.g., primarily rights to notice, access, and consent 
regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data, to enable them to make 
decisions about how to manage their data. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013).
89 More generally, Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) includes notice, access, 
choice, accuracy, data minimization, security, and accountability. See Shackelford et al.,
supra note 1, at 441.
90 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS i, 4 (May 2000), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-
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notice containing what information is collected, how it is used, and its 
information disclosure practices.91 OSPs must “obtain verifiable parental 
consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of such personal information from 
children.”92 The parent of a child who supplies personal information must have 
the right to obtain “a description of the specific types of personal information 
collected from the child by that operator” and have “the opportunity at any time
to refuse to permit the operator’s further use or maintenance . . . or future 
online collection, of personal information from that child.”93 The operator must 
also provide reasonable means, in the given circumstances, for “the parent to 
obtain any personal information collected from that child.”94 COPPA further 
prohibits “conditioning a child’s participation in a game, the offering of a prize, 
or another activity on the child disclosing more personal information than is 
reasonably necessary to participate in such activity.”95 In terms of security, 
COPPA regulation requires OSPs to “establish and maintain reasonable 
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal 
information collected from children.”96
To enforce COPPA regulation, the FTC has the authority to create rules and 
police unfair and deceptive trade practices, which include private companies’
privacy policies.97 Consequently, it can issue fines and seek preliminary or 
permanent injunctive remedies for those who do not comply with COPPA 
regulation.98 While to date most cases have resulted in settlement agreements,99
                                                                                                                     
practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5SV-YZ2A]; Garber, supra note 69, at 153.
91 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
92 Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
93 Id. § 6502(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
94 Id. (emphasis added).
95 Id. § 6502(b)(1)(C).
96 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
97 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012). The FTC authority stems from both The Federal 
Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTC Act), ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 45(a), 6505(a) (2012)) and COPPA. It has the authority to promulgate and update rules 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (2012)). See
Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and
Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 811 (2011); Solove 
& Hartzog, supra note 83, at 588. 
98 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(l)–(m), 53(b) (2012). In 2016, a group of toy and children’s
entertainment conglomerates were fined by the FTC in the amount of $835,000 for letting 
advertisers illegally track kids online. Shaun Nichols, Viacom, Mattel and Pals Busted for 
Stalking Kids with Creepy Web Ads, THE REGISTER (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/09/14/viacom_mattel_busted_for_tracking_kids 
[https://perma.cc/37C9-XHKY]. Violating COPPA requirements could currently lead to 
fines up to $40,000 per violation. See Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts, 81 
Fed. Reg. 42476 (June 30, 2016).
99 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 83, at 585. The FTC reported that concerning data 
security, they “entered into approximately 60 settlements related to companies’ failure to 
protect consumers’ personal information.” See Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting 
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the FTC reported that from 2000 to 2016 it “brought over 20 COPPA cases and 
collected millions of dollars in civil penalties.”100
COPPA has received much scholarly attention since its inception,101 but it 
now extends far beyond regulation for the internet. Being online in 2019 means 
something different than what it meant back in the late 1990s when COPPA was 
enacted. Naturally, Congress could not have foreseen the technological 
developments that might pose new threats to children like that of IoT. Despite 
these developments, COPPA regulation still governs the datafication of children 
online. Does COPPA apply to IoToys and other devices within the IoToys 
market? Are the legal safeguards to protect children’s privacy under COPPA—
initially set twenty years ago—still relevant to regulate IoToys? How should 
policymakers balance the potential benefits of this innovative technology with 
the dangers they entail for children?
B. Applicability of the Legal Framework 
Although crafted long before the emergence of IoToys, COPPA regulation 
undoubtedly applies on them. These toys generally target children, and most—
if not all—should be labeled as targeting children aged under thirteen. Even if 
the prime audience for some of these toys is arguably older than thirteen, 
COPPA will still apply when those OSPs knowingly collect personal 
information from younger children.102 This second category encompasses 
gathering any personal information from a child, including the following: (1) 
“Requesting, prompting, or encouraging a child to submit personal 
information online ; (2) Enabling a child to make personal information publicly 
available in identifiable form. . . . or (3) Passive tracking of a child online.”103
                                                                                                                     
Chair, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Senator Mark R. Warner (June 22, 2017) [hereinafter Letter 
to Senator Warner], available at https://www.scribd.com/document/352278126/2017-06-
21-Response-to-Senator-Warner-Letter [https://perma.cc/GH58-HM2A].
100 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (Jan. 2017), 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016#children
[https://perma.cc/HYX5-PB9H].
101 While many articles that relate to COPPA are further cited within this Article, here 
are few examples of such scholarly work: Garber, supra note 69 (discussing the need for 
privacy with respect to the increase in technology use by children); Solove & Hartzog, supra 
note 83 (examining the FTC’s privacy law jurisprudence); Joseph A. Zavaletta, COPPA, 
Kids, Cookies & Chat Rooms: We’re from the Government and We’re Here to Protect Your 
Children, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249 (2000–2001) (examining the 
evolution of the need for privacy online); Joshua Warmund, Note, Can COPPA Work? An 
Analysis of the Parental Consent Measures in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act,
11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 189 (2000) (analyzing the parental consent 
measures in COPPA).
102 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2(1)–(2) (2012).
103 Id. § 312.2(1)–(3). Note, however, that an OSP will not be considered to have 
collected personal information under the COPPA rule “if it takes reasonable measures to 
delete all or virtually all personal information from a child’s postings before they are made 
public and also delete such information from its records.” Id. § 312.2(2).
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Children’s data in IoToys easily fall within these definitions. The mere use of 
IoToys devices that children can talk to should be deemed a way of encouraging 
the child to submit personal information.104 To clarify the applicability of 
COPPA to IoToys, the FTC recently stated clearly that “connected toys or other 
Internet of Things devices” will be deemed a website or online service for 
COPPA regulation.105
While the IoToys market is rapidly expanding, not all toys raise similar 
concerns. Smart toys that are not connected to the internet naturally do not raise 
COPPA-related concerns.106 Connected toys, while potentially able to trigger 
COPPA regulation, pose no risks to children’s privacy as long as their ability to 
collect, retain, and transmit data is relatively low to non-existent, and as long as 
connecting to them, lawfully or not, cannot generate sensitive information.107 It 
might be presumptuous to assume that all IoToys devices trigger COPPA by 
default, but at least the majority of this market will easily fall under one of 
COPPA’s categories. For example, audio recordings containing a child’s voice 
or imagery, if collected by an OSP, would suffice to be deemed personal 
information under COPPA.108 In addition, when a device enables recording and 
transmitting data, it could potentially capture personal data such as the name, 
home address, online contact information, and even social security numbers of 
children, and thus might also trigger COPPA.109
Having established that COPPA generally applies to IoToys, the next 
question is whether OSPs comply with their legal obligations. As noted, COPPA
regulation necessitates OSPs to meet the following five requirements: “(1) 
notice; (2) [verifiable] parental consent prior to the collection, use, and/or 
disclosure of personal information from a child; (3) a right of parental review of 
such information; (4) proportionality; and (5) reasonable security policies.110 To 
enjoy safe haven from enforcement action under COPPA regulation, companies 
could also follow self-regulatory guidelines pre-approved by the FTC.111 As for 
                                                                                                                     
104 See id. § 6502(b)(1)(C)–(D).
105 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for 
Your Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/childrens-online-privacy-protection-rule-six-step-compliance 
[https://perma.cc/FUG2-FURG]; see also Letter to Senator Warner, supra note 99 (“The
COPPA Rule applies not only to websites, but also to other online services, including
connected toys and associated mobile apps.”).
106 See 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (regulating collection of only information on the Internet). It 
should be further clarified that if a toy could connect to another device via Bluetooth, then 
some privacy risks might also rise, as hackers could potentially gain access to these toys. 
107 Id.
108 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2012).
109 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501(b)(8), 6502(a)(1).
110 Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary 
Codes, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 355, 394 (2011) (internal citation omitted).
111 16 C.F.R. § 312.11(a)–(b) (2012); Rubinstein, supra note 110, at 395; see also 15 
U.S.C. § 6503(b)(1) (2012).
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the latter, without transparency of FTC-approved practices,112 this Article 
focuses on COPPA’s five general requirements. Each of these is followed by 
examples of its being satisfied by key market players in the IoToys market.113
The first component is notice.114 This form of regulation-by-information is 
a well-known practice in many markets.115 Under it, consumers must be 
apprised of the various implications of using a product they have purchased or 
a service they registered to.116 As COPPA applies to the internet, regulators 
require that a notice must be posted on the website.117 A link to the notice must 
be prominent and clearly labeled, and appear on the home or landing page or 
screen offering services where personal information is collected from 
                                                                                                                     
There are three key criteria for safe harbor approval. Self-regulatory guidelines must 
(1) meet or exceed the five statutory requirements identified above; (2) include an 
‘effective, mandatory mechanism for the independent assessment of . . . compliance 
with the guidelines,’ such as random or periodic review of privacy practices conducted 
by a seal program or third-party; and (3) contain ‘effective incentives’ to ensure 
compliance with the guidelines such as mandatory public reporting of disciplinary 
actions, consumer redress, voluntary payments to the government, or referral of 
violators to the FTC.
Rubinstein, supra note 110, at 395 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 312.11 (2012)); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 6503 (2012).
112 While the FTC announced that it approved applications like the iKeepSafe Safe 
Harbor Program, it is difficult to assess their practices without transparency. See Letter from 
Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Marsali S. Hancock, President & CEO, 
Internet Keep Safe Coal., Application of iKeepSafe Safe Harbor Program for Approval of 
Its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule Safe Harbor Program (Aug. 1, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/573811/140806ikeepsafeap
p.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W43-5PU5].
113 It should be noted that Hello Barbie is currently certified by the FTC as COPPA 
compliant under the kidSAFE Seal Program. See infra note 216. Hence, the use of Hello 
Barbie is not to imply that it does not comply with COPPA regulation, but rather to exemplify 
the practices of key-market players within each of the five FIPPs within the regulatory 
framework.
114 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a) (2012).
115 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 650 (2011) [hereinafter Ben-Shahar & Schneider, Failure]. Regulation by 
information refers to a broad type of regulatory mechanisms that rely mostly on the notion 
that individuals can make more-educated choices when they obtain more information. Id. at 
649. Under such regulatory mechanism, the “discloser” gives the “disclosee” information, 
and thus the latter can make better decisions for him, and likewise reduce the “power” of the 
former to control the latter. Id. For examples of disclosure requirements set by legislation, 
see id. at 649–50. For more on regulation through information, see generally OMRI BEN-
SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2013) [hereinafter BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, MORE] (exploring 
“Digital Natives” in regards to privacy, creativity, cyber-bullying, and online political 
activism).
116 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, Failure, supra note 115, at 649.
117 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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children.118 The notice must include “what information is collected from 
children by the operator, how the operator uses such information, and the 
operator’s disclosure practices for such information.”119 It must also be clear 
and understandable and in writing,120 and the OSP must make reasonable efforts 
to notify parents directly regarding its practices.121
Many of the key market players, like ToyTalk, for instance, are found 
largely to comply with the notice component.122 ToyTalk posts clear links to its 
privacy policy and statements on what information is collected, how it is used, 
and its disclosure practices on both its homepage and the designated webpage 
for downloading the companion app for both Barbie products.123 While its 
evaluation is subjective, it also uses clear and understandable language.124
Genesis, however, might fulfill this requirement less. Cayla’s homepage 
currently does not contain such a link.125 Nor does the App Store, when the 
designated app is downloaded.126 Cayla’s privacy policy is only visible after a 
user goes to the “More” section on the top menu.127
                                                                                                                     
118 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(d) (“The link must be in close proximity to the requests for 
information in each such area.”).
119 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
120 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(a) (2012) (“Such notice must be clearly and understandably 
written, complete, and must contain no unrelated, confusing, or contradictory materials.”). 
[T] he online notice of the Web site or online service’s information practices must state 
the following: (1) The name, address, telephone number, and email address of all 
operators collecting or maintaining personal information from children through the Web 
site or online service; . . . (2) A description of what information the operator collects 
from children, including whether the Web site or online service enables a child to make 
personal information publicly available; how the operator uses such information; and 
the operator’s disclosure practices for such information; and (3) That the parent can 
review or have deleted the child’s personal information, and refuse to permit further 
collection or use of the child’s information, and state the procedures for doing so.
Id. § 312.4(d).
121 See id. § 312.4(b) (requiring operators to “include[e] notice of any material change 
in the collection, use, or disclosure practices to which the parent has previously consented”).
122 See, e.g., ToyTalk, TOYTALK, https://www.toytalk.com [https://perma.cc/2J2J-
4YD6].
123 Id.; Hello Barbie™ Companion App, https://www.toytalk.com/product/hello-barbie 
[https://perma.cc/4HS4-U8EY]; Hello Dreamhouse™ Companion App,
https://www.toytalk.com/product/hello-house [https://perma.cc/B322-H4H7].
124 See supra notes 122–23. 
125 See Original Cayla, MY FRIEND CAYLA, https://www.myfriendcayla.com/original-
cayla [https://perma.cc/6MPE-ENND].
126 See My Friend Cayla App (EN-US), GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/
apps/details?id=com.toyquest.Cayla.en_us [https://perma.cc/4ZSS-SL8F]; My Friend Cayla 
App, APP STORE, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/my-friend-cayla-app-us-english/id113540
2140?mt=8 [https://perma.cc/278Y-K7ZF].
127 See Original Cayla, supra note 125.
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The second component of COPPA requires verifiable parental consent,128
namely more than parents’ implied consent, for the collection, use, or disclosure 
of personal information obtained from children.129 The parent must receive 
notice of such use and authorize the “collection, use, or disclosure of the 
personal information”130 and must have the option not to consent to disclosure 
of information to third parties.131 The steps for verifiable parental consent are 
vaguely articulated as “any reasonable effort (taking into consideration 
available technology), including a request for authorization.”132 There are some 
exceptions to the consent requirement. For example, if an OSP uses a child’s
personal information for internal purposes alone and does not disclose this 
information, it could obtain consent through the method known as “email 
plus.”133 In addition, the FTC could approve other methods that satisfy the 
parental consent requirement.134
What should be deemed a reasonable effort in the IoToys realm? 
Connecting the device, including configuration with the home Wi-Fi, strikes one 
as insufficient to fulfill this requirement, as COPPA insists on parents’ explicit 
verifiable consent and lists methods such as a signed letter/form, video chat, or 
phone call with trained personnel.135 Currently, parental consent for Barbie 
                                                                                                                     
128 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a)(1) (2012).
129 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.2, 312.4–312.5 (2012). 
There are some exceptions, however, set under 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2) (2012) and 16 C.F.R. 
§ 312.5 (2012).
130 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2012).
131 Id. § 312.5(a)(2).
132 15 U.S.C. § 6501(9) (2012) (emphasis added).
133 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 105. Under this method, the OSP sends an 
email to the parent and has them respond with their consent. Id. The OSP then sends a 
confirmation to the parent (via email, letter, or phone call). Id. OSPs must also notify the 
parents how to revoke their consent at any given time. Id.
134 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b)(3) (2012). Under this safe harbor program, the FTC could 
determine that the method of the OSP meets the requirements set for verifiable parental 
consent. See id.
135 See id. § 312.5(b)(2). These methods include:
Requiring a parent, in connection with a monetary transaction, to use a credit card, debit 
card, or other online payment system that provides notification of each discrete 
transaction to the primary account holder . . . and [v]erifying a parent’s identity by 
checking a form of government-issued identification against databases of such 
information, where the parent’s identification is deleted by the operator from its records 
promptly after such verification is complete.
Id. § 312.5(b)(2)(ii), (v). If the OSP “does not disclose (as defined by § 312.2) children’s
personal information,” it “may use an email coupled with additional steps to provide 
assurances that the person providing the consent is the parent.” Id. § 312.5(b)(2)(vi) (“Such 
additional steps include: Sending a confirmatory email to the parent following receipt of 
consent, or obtaining a postal address or telephone number from the parent and confirming 
the parent’s consent by letter or telephone call.”). Id.
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products is obtained by creating an account and accessing ToyTalk services.136
Genesis merely states that using its website or providing it with any information 
constitutes consent to the “collection, processing, maintenance and transfer of 
personal information.”137 It further states: “If you do not agree to this, please do 
not use our website or provide us with any information.”138 Genesis, however,
notes that it “will not knowingly accept any information by any children under
the age of [thirteen] without the express permission of their parent and/or 
guardian.”139
The third step is right of parental review.140 At a parent’s request, OSPs are 
required to provide the following three things: “(1) A description of the specific 
types or categories of personal information collected from children by the 
operator;”141 “(2) The opportunity . . . to refuse . . . further use or future online
collection of personal information from that child, and to direct the operator to 
delete the child’s personal information;”142 and (3) Grant parents the right to 
review the collected information.143
For Barbie products, ToyTalk specifies that parents have the right to review
or delete any personal information collected from their child that it retains.144
Parents also have the “right to review and delete” any audio files in their account 
and “may also permanently delete their accounts via ToyTalk’s website.”145
Even lacking a request, ToyTalk claims that it will delete personal information 
that children provide when it “becomes aware of it, and [it] will contractually 
require [its service] providers” to act similarly.146 For Cayla, Genesis claims 
that parents have the right to ask not to process their personal information for 
marketing purposes, the right to ask to update their records or delete any 
personal information the company holds about them (but mentions that it “may 
need to keep that information for legitimate business or legal purposes”), and 
                                                                                                                     
136 See TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54 (“Unless Barbie Products are used only in 
offline mode, we obtain parental consent for the use of the Service using an approved method 
under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (‘COPPA’). By creating an account and 
accessing the Services, you are certifying that you are authorized to provide such consent 
and responsible for all activities under the account.”).
137 See Privacy Policy, GENESIS TOYS, https://www.genesis-toys.com/privacypolicy 
[https://perma.cc/NM2C-7RHE] (last updated Feb. 23, 2015).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(c) (2012).
141 Id. § 312.6(a)(1). Examples are “name, address, telephone number, email address, 
hobbies, and extracurricular activities.” Id.
142 Id. § 312.6(a)(2).
143 To comply, considering available technology, OSPs must “[e]nsure that the requestor 
is a parent of that child” and that the means “not be unduly burdensome to the parent.” Id.
§ 312.6(a)(3)(i)–(ii).
144 TOYTALK, FAQ, supra note 60.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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the right to access information it holds about them.147 Essentially, these 
practices comply with the third step of COPPA regulation.
The fourth step requires scrutiny of whether OSPs “condition a child’s
participation in a game, the offering of a prize, or another activity on 
the child’s disclosing more personal information than is reasonably necessary to 
participate in such activity.”148 This step might be trickier with respect to IoToys 
than to websites. Arguably, regarding toys, almost every activity could be 
viewed as imposing conditions and disclosure of data on the child’s
participation. Also, while not all data will be deemed personal information, 
many data might.149 The difficulty in IoToys, however, would be assessing 
whether such disclosure is “necessary to participate in such activity,” and more 
closely, whether it is reasonable.150 Practically, without disclosure of the 
datamining practices of OSPs and scrutiny of how personal information is linked 
to the child’s participation, it is difficult to examine how companies comply 
with this requirement.
The final evaluation step is whether OSPs maintain reasonable security 
policies.151 OSPs are obliged to “[e]stablish and maintain reasonable procedures 
to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information 
collected from children.”152 Releasing the information to a third party requires 
ensuring that the third party takes similar steps to protect the data and can vouch 
for these measures.153 To reduce the risk of privacy violations in a cybersecurity 
breach, the FTC also imposes on OSPs “[d]ata retention and deletion 
requirements.”154
Surveys have shown that many IoToys OSPs implement data security 
measures in their toys.155 Barbie products use secure, encrypted 
communications when transferring all personal information over the web.156
Wi-Fi credentials are stored in an encrypted section so that the products can 
connect to the internet.157 The Hello Barbie Hologram uses 256-bit encryption 
                                                                                                                     
147 See Privacy Policy, supra note 33.
148 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(d) (2012).
149 Id. § 312.2.
150 Id. § 312.3(d).
151 Id. § 312.3(e).
152 Id.
153 Id. § 312.8; see also CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 6 (“If the 
operator transfers children’s personal information to a third party, the operator must also 
ensure that the third party has taken similar steps to protect the data.”).
154 16 C.F.R. § 312.10 (2012).
155 CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 9. These measures include but are 
not limited to “firewalls; user restrictions, access controls, and authentication procedures; 
remote access through an encrypted VPN tunnel; monitoring networks for unauthorized 
activity; regular updates and patches to software; vulnerability testing; and engaging 
independent security services to test systems for vulnerabilities.” Id.
156 TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54.
157 See id.
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when it sends queries to the cloud.158 For Cayla, Genesis claims that it 
undertakes internal reviews of its data management, including “appropriate 
encryption and physical security measures to guard against unauthorised access 
to systems where we store personal information.”159
Are these security policies reasonable? Difficult to say, as it depends on the 
toy in question.160 But in practice they are found not secure enough: IoToys has 
often been breached since its inception,161 including Hello Barbie.162 Another 
problem is that under the current regulatory framework, the reasonableness of 
the security measures will usually be evaluated ex post, mostly after a data 
                                                                                                                     
158 See Moynihan, supra note 40. It should be noted that Aristotle was supposed to use 
encryption to keep at least some form of information private. Aristotle, QUALCOMM (Jan. 3, 
2017), https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/mattel-s-nabi-brand-introduces-
first-ever-connected-kids-room-platform-in-tandem-with-microsoft-and-qualcomm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K5Z4-ZZCT]. Mattel claimed that they encrypt every piece of data using 
AES 256-bit end-to-end symmetric key encryption and create a unique device-to-device key 
to ensure safety of data streams. Id.
159 Privacy Policy, supra note 33.
160 For an analysis of security flaws in IoToys, see Valente & Cardenas, supra note 51,
at 19.
161 See, e.g., Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, One of the Largest Hacks Yet Exposes Data 
on Hundreds of Thousands of Kids, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 27, 2015), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/one-of-the-largest-hacks-yet-exposes-data-on-hundreds-
of-thousands-of-kids [https://perma.cc/Q8XM-58YB] (describing a breach of consumer data 
to VTech Electronics North America, a maker of children’s connected tablets); Alex Hern, 
CloudPets Stuffed Toys Leak Details of Half a Million Users, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/28/cloudpets-data-breach-leaks-
details-of-500000-children-and-adults [https://perma.cc/4VUM-4TDE] (describing a data
breach that compromised personal information of more than half a million people who
bought the toys); Mark Stanislav, R7-2015-27 and R7-2015-24: Fisher-Price Smart Toy® & 
hereO GPS Platform Vulnerabilities (FIXED), RAPID7 (Feb. 2, 2016), https://community.
rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/2016/02/02/security-vulnerabilities-within-fisher-
price-smart-toy-hereo-gps-platform [https://perma.cc/Z783-Q7P2]; Danny Yadron, Fisher-
Price Smart Bear Allowed Hacking of Children’s Biographical Data, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/02/fisher-price-mattel-smart-
toy-bear-data-hack-technology [https://perma.cc/JNE3-SA6G] (noting that the app 
connected to the Fisher-Price toy had several security flaws that would allow hackers to 
obtain data).
162 Samuel Gibbs, Hackers Can Hijack Wi-Fi Hello Barbie to Spy on Your Children,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/26/
hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbie-to-spy-on-your-children [https://perma.cc/GVA8-
UTMK] (showing how hackers hijacked a Hello Barbie); see also Richard Chirgwin, Hello 
Barbie Controversy Re-Ignited with Insecurity Claims, THE REGISTER (Nov. 29, 2015), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/11/29/hello_barbie_controversy_reignited_with_insecur
ity_claims [https://perma.cc/4M25-AQGD] (discussing Hello Barbie’s potential to be 
hacked). Another example is that of “Furby hacking,” i.e., hacking into the toy Furby and 
manipulating it. This widely-known hobby dates back to the toy’s original release in 
1998. Darren Orf, Hackers Found a Way to Make Furbies Even Creepier, GIZMODO (Feb. 9, 
2016), http://gizmodo.com/hackers-found-a-way-to-make-furbies-even-creepier-17566831
10 [https://perma.cc/FW5S-KV5Z].
424 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
breach.163 A recent example concerns VTech Electronics Limited, an electronic 
toy manufacturer, which experienced a major cybersecurity breach.164 Only 
then did consumers learn that their children’s data was not encrypted even 
though the firm’s privacy policy stated that it was.165
Whether OSPs generally comply with COPPA is disputable. With some 
exceptions for actions subject to legal interpretation, most of the key market 
players probably comply with most of COPPA requirements, at least in their 
narrowest sense. Bearing in mind the FTC’s enforcement prerogative, one 
would presume that at least the key players will comply with the default 
requirements of COPPA in the absence of any substantial market failures. 
Nevertheless, compliance with COPPA does not mean that COPPA in its current 
form properly safeguards children’s privacy within the realm of IoToys. As the 
next Part shows, the transition from the internet to IoToys necessitates a 
reevaluation of COPPA as to whether it is the optimal mechanism to protect 
children’s privacy online; a recalibration of COPPA in light of IoToys’s
challenges is suggested.
IV. REEVALUATING AND RECALIBRATING CHILDREN’S PRIVACY
While it may be disputable whether IoToys OSPs currently comply with 
COPPA regulation, the broader normative question is whether COPPA 
regulation adequately meets the challenge of IoToys. This is not to argue that 
COPPA must be directed towards a specific technology or a sector (unlike a 
cohort, as currently crafted), but rather that the implications of COPPA—
through the examination of new technologies—might suggest broad 
implications on the perception of American privacy regulation. Accordingly, 
this Part assesses how to protect children’s privacy in IoToys under the current 
American framework. The argument proceeds in two stages: the first 
differentiates regular online activities from activities within the IoToys realm as 
regards regulating children’s privacy. It maintains that fundamental differences 
between the two require policymakers to recalibrate the regulatory framework 
that governs children’s privacy. The second stage offers insights into such 
recalibration, while revisiting COPPA’s five essential incorporated FIPPs by 
suggesting practical adjustments to COPPA regulation in the IoToys realm.
                                                                                                                     
163 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Electronic Toy Maker VTech Settles FTC 
Allegations That It Violated Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC Act (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/01/electronic-toy-maker-vtech-
settles-ftc-allegations-it-violated [https://perma.cc/K7SQ-TBPG].
164 See id.
165 See id. VTech eventually settled with the FTC and was obliged to pay $650,000 for 
a COPPA violation. Id.
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A. Revisiting Children’s Privacy in IoToys
The common purpose of regulating conduct that relates to both the internet 
and IoToys is obviously to provide safeguards for children against potential 
harms, mainly risks to their informational privacy. On the other hand, a one-
size-fits-all approach may be inappropriate, as key differences may exist 
between the internet and IoToys regarding children’s privacy interests. While 
IoToys depends on the internet, its implications for children’s privacy are not 
necessarily synonymous with visiting websites. 
COPPA was crafted in an era when policymakers sought to protect the 
privacy of personal information collected from and about children on the World 
Wide Web.166 The need to protect children’s privacy in IoToys not only exists 
but is actually greater.167 It is based on the core differences between the internet
and IoT in general, where IoT “increase[s] the number of vulnerabilities that 
could potentially be exploited to conduct” unlawful activities; it increases the 
amount of data collected on individuals and thereby increases the chances of 
privacy violations; and it reduces the capacity to control the vast amount of 
information.168 More closely, IoToys’s design, or stated differently, 
architecture, affects the volume of data gathered, its potential variety, and access 
to it. 
IoToys broadens the volume of children’s data due to various factors. As a 
rather intuitive argument, it does so simply by adding another form of 
connection to the internet. Arguably, however, children might view IoToys
devices as substitute goods for websites, that is, essentially they will merely 
replace data that might have been shared online with data that is shared with the 
toy. But it is hard to see these two different forms of children’s play as basically 
the same, as they sometimes perform different functions and might appeal 
differently at least to some children. The two might offer different types of 
interaction or play, hence they are unlikely to be considered interchangeable 
(substitute) goods for all children.
More closely, IoToys expands the volume of data as it widens the target 
audience by increasing accessibility to it. IoToys shifts the form of 
communication from writing (typing) to talking, thereby making the toys 
accessible to a wider cohort of children who are otherwise unable to use a 
computer or browser, or simply cannot yet read or write.169 This relates not only
to younger children, but also to other children who experience difficulty writing 
or reading. These toys offer them increased access to the internet.
                                                                                                                     
166 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2012).
167 See Shackelford et al., supra note 1, at 427.
168 Id.
169 Notably, however, IoToys might be more challenging than the internet for children 
that experience hearing impairment or speech impediments.
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Another factor that increases volume is computer or technological 
illiteracy.170 As a core argument, children, at least young ones, might be more 
accustomed to playing with toys than using a computer; hence, IoToys devices
will appeal to them more and be generally easier to use. Notably, however, this 
argument might become less relevant for digital natives,171 as the use of 
computers like smartphones or tablets might begin at relatively early stages of 
their lives.172 Still, after the setup step, usually undertaken by the child’s parent, 
operating IoToys devices like Hello Barbie or Cayla is generally easier and 
quicker than using the internet via computers. Perhaps IoToys devices might 
also be more enjoyable, hence, the gamification by itself increases the volume 
of data. 
Volume could also be linked with mobility. Computers are not naturally 
limited physically to remote rooms of a house, and laptops, mobile phones, 
tablets, and other potential connected devices can also connect to the internet.
Nevertheless, parents might decide to limit their children’s accessing the 
internet, especially young ones, to a computer that is fairly visible to the parents.
IoToys devices’ mobility, however, is different due to the toys’ architecture.
They can be used wherever the children want, as long as an internet connection 
is available.173 Thus, the mere fact that these devices are generally more mobile 
than traditional computers can increase children’s access to the internet and 
increase the volume of gathered data.
Finally, volume of data could also be under parental control—less as regards 
the physical space than the gathered information. On the internet, parents can 
sometimes use self-management tools—also known as Privacy-Enhancing 
                                                                                                                     
170 Computer illiteracy usually refers to the lack of knowledge and ability a person has 
to use computers, while technological illiteracy refers to reduced knowledge on the handling 
and use of technological tools, including computers but also internet use. For further reading 
on these definitions, see Randall S. Davies, Understanding Technology Literacy: A 
Framework for Evaluating Educational Technology Integration, 55 TECHTRENDS 45, 46–47
(2011).
171 While these definitions evolve over time, “digital natives” generally refers to those 
who grew-up in the digital age, as opposed to “digital immigrants.” For more on these terms, 
see Marc Prensky, Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1, 9 ON HORIZON 1, 1 (2001). 
See generally JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES (2008) (discussing the implications of the first digital 
natives coming of age).
172 See Jacqueline Howard, Kids Under 9 Spend More than 2 Hours a Day on Screens, 
Report Shows, CNN (Oct. 19, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/19/health/children-
smartphone-tablet-use-report/index.html [https://perma.cc/CXF7-BPS6]. As reported by 
Common Sense Media, a nonprofit organization, in 2017, 42% of American children aged 
eight or younger had their own tablet devices. Id.; see also David Nagel, One-Third of U.S. 
Students Use School-Issued Mobile Devices, THE JOURNAL (Apr. 8, 2014), 
https://thejournal.com/articles/2014/04/08/a-third-of-secondary-students-use-school-
issued-mobile-devices.aspx [https://perma.cc/2YMU-CFH3] (discussing the prevalence of 
technology access among children).
173 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Technologies (PET)—designed to enhance users’ privacy.174 We also encounter 
other filtering software as a partial solution to online dangers, indeed, perhaps 
above all, to limit children’s ability to access websites or provide personal 
information.175 While these are far from a perfect solution to regulate children’s
online behavior, the IoToys market is more complex. Once a toy is in use, it is 
difficult for parents to control what their children are doing at any given time if 
the OSP does not provide them with privacy setting tools. Thus, the ability to 
control or block access might be more limited without such self-management 
tools, consequently the volume of the shared data might rise.
Regarding the data’s variety, if the toy seems trustworthy from a child’s
perspective, he or she might also share diverse information with it, which might 
also be more sensitive. Toys in general might seem harmless from a child’s
perspective. Children might, for instance, conceive their toy to be their new best 
friend and form an attachment.176 Children might even anthropomorphize these 
toys, that is, become convinced that they are human, which might lure them to 
disclose data that is sensitive, at least from their own perspective (like 
secrets).177 Naturally, however, this aspect could be challenged to the extent that 
IoToys might also be more limited in the types of gathered data. By this 
argument, websites could be more diverse in the types of interactions offered, 
thus could consequently extract a wider variety of data from their users. It could 
also be further challenged that anthropomorphizing these toys might actually 
lead to children not trusting them, or rather, telling them lies. Still, along with 
developments in IoToys devices, their ability to offer more types of interactive 
                                                                                                                     
174 See generally Ian Goldberg et al., Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for the Internet,
PROCEEDINGS OF IEEE COMPCON ’97 103 (1997) (overviewing PETs). Good examples of 
PETs are communication anonymizers and Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID), digital signature 
algorithms supporting anonymity. Other examples include the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) designed to provide “smarter Privacy Tools for the Web.” Platform for 
Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, W3C (Oct. 3. 2007), https://www.w3.org/P3P 
[https://perma.cc/WWF9-BB4X]. Essentially, P3P is a protocol that allows websites to 
declare their intended use of information they collect. See id. A final example is the 
TrackMeNot browser plug-in, which “send[s] ‘decoy’ queries to popular search 
engines . . . whenever a user searches” them while generating “algorithmically generated
‘noise.’” Daniel C. Howe, Surveillance Countermeasures: Expressive Privacy via 
Obfuscation, INTERARTIVE (June 2016), https://interartive.org/2016/06/surveillance-
countermeasures-expressive-privacy-via-obfuscation-daniel-c-howe 
[https://perma.cc/J29E-Z3JL].
175 Examples in the early 2000s included computer programs like Cybersitter and 
NetNanny. Hertzel, supra note 69, at 447–48.
176 See Vlahos, supra note 15. Upon initiation, Hello Barbie explicitly communicates 
that to the user. Id. Upon asking the child’s name, Hello Barbie replies, “I just know we’re 
going to be great friends.” Id.
177 See id. Professor Doris Bergen argued that it is very difficult for children, especially 
young ones, “to distinguish what is real from what is not real.” Id.; see also Woodrow 
Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 787 (2015) (arguing that young
children might become attached to robots “acting autonomously” and “disclose secrets that 
they would not tell their parents or teachers”).
428 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
games will not be more limited than websites and will most likely continue to 
expand.
The final aspect is access to the toy and the stored data. For its evaluation, 
access should be divided between authorized and unauthorized. In terms of 
authorized access, the data gathered through websites and IoToys devices 
should not differ greatly, depending on their marketing purposes. Unauthorized 
access, however, is generally facilitated in IoToys due to potential security 
flaws.178 Indeed, it is difficult to assess the differences between the security of 
websites and of IoToys in general. On the whole, IoToys and websites could 
greatly differ in their cybersecurity measures. The difference would mainly be 
that IoToys’s data storage is divided into three hackable methods to obtain data 
(through the toy, the app, or the cloud), while websites can rely on a single 
database.179 Thus, the insecurity of children’s data in IoToys may be greater 
simply because there are more ways of obtaining it.
The differences between the volume of data gathered, its potential variety,
and access to it imply that IoToys can gather more information than the internet 
can and that this information might be more sensitive and less secure. These 
differences could essentially lead to higher risks to children’s privacy. To 
mitigate these risks within the COPPA framework, policymakers must revisit 
and recalibrate parents’ self-management of their children’s privacy, the OSP’s
requirements, and public enforcement of IoToys.
B. Recalibrating the Legal Framework
COPPA fails to regulate IoToys properly. While the FTC has amended the 
COPPA rule and has issued further guidelines for parents as well as OSPs in the 
IoToys market, regulating IoToys requires acknowledging the differences 
between it and the internet.180 Examining the current COPPA requirements in 
light of these differences clearly shows how inadequate COPPA is to properly 
safeguard children from privacy risks. This inadequacy must be further 
addressed by recalibration.
As a general matter, one might argue that the legal framework of sectoral 
privacy in general is no longer applicable in this age and that the United States
should take the path chosen by the European Union and embrace an omnibus 
privacy regime.181 One might argue that it is not wise to keep updating laws 
such as COPPA due to the rise of new technologies, but rather craft technology-
                                                                                                                     
178 See generally Valente & Cardenas, supra note 51 (analyzing IoToys’s security 
systems).
179 See id. at 19–21 (mentioning three data entry points).
180 See supra notes 82, 105, and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1762 (2010). But see Paul M. Schwartz, 
Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 946 (2009) (discussing the drawbacks of 
embracing an omnibus privacy regime in the United States).
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neutral laws.182 While such moves could very well be advisable, this Article will 
not undertake this important theoretical debate but will rather pragmatically 
focus on the current approach to American privacy and examine its current 
applicability.
But before suggesting how COPPA should be recalibrated, it is crucial to 
rule out other potential legal measures currently set in the United States to allay 
these risks. For instance, the potential constitutional protection of children’s
privacy will not advance the discussion on IoToys much. Privacy is often 
interpreted as a right that could be located within various constitutional 
amendments such as the Fourth Amendment,183 but by its present interpretation 
of the Supreme Court, it will not extend to non-state actors, which include 
IoToys manufacturers and OSPs, so information privacy will generally not be 
protected by it.184 Accordingly, tort law will be fairly limited in dealing with the 
risks of IoToys as it mainly concerns disclosure of embarrassing personal 
information and not simply the collection and use of personally identifiable 
information.185 Consumer protection law could be invoked to some extent, but 
it will mainly deal with the IoToys device itself, and less with the practices of 
safeguarding the stored data, at least on the federal level.186
                                                                                                                     
182 For more on technology-neutral legislation, see generally Michael Birnhack, Reverse 
Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 24 (2012).
183 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184 Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. 
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 502 (1995). As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the 
Bill of Rights grants implicit constitutional protection for privacy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1964). Examples 
of this protection include prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting 
freedom of assembly. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV. Invoking constitutional rights, however, 
requires that a state action be present. Reidenberg, supra, at 502. Thus, these rights protect 
citizens against the government, while they fail to grant protection for citizens against each 
other (including against private companies); see id. at 501–03.
185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). As described 
by Professor William L. Prosser, the right to privacy could be protected to some extent by 
tort law under four branches: “(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into 
his private affairs; (2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) 
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; [and] (4) Appropriation, 
for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” William L. Prosser, 
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). Establishing a tort claim under these branches 
in IoToys will be difficult in most instances as misappropriation protects only against the 
unauthorized use of a person’s name or likeness for commercial purposes, Prosser, supra, at 
401–07, public disclosure of private facts protects against the circulation to the general public 
of offensive information (that is not otherwise publicly available), Id. at 392–98, and false 
light protects against wide dissemination of information that is misleading or erroneous, Id.
at 398–401. What might be relevant is intrusion upon seclusion, which protects against 
highly offensive methods of gathering information in private areas. Id. at 389–92. For more 
on torts and privacy, see Reidenberg, supra note 184, at 504–06, and Jessica Litman, 
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (2000).
186 For more on consumer protection law in the United States, see generally Spencer 
Weber Waller et al., Consumer Protection in the United States: An Overview, EUR. J.
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COPPA regulation is not the sole component of the current regulatory 
framework that potentially protects children’s privacy from the risks of IoToys. 
Still, it is highly improbable that other legal measures could be invoked in the 
IoToys context or be sufficient to protect children’s privacy. An obvious ex ante
solution for not only reducing the potential risks of IoToys devices but also 
removing them altogether would be for policymakers to simply ban their 
manufacture, import, and even use. This solution might not be as farfetched as 
it might sound. When Furby was first introduced in 1998, the National Security 
Agency banned it out of fear that it might record classified conversations.187 In 
the IoToys market, German authorities embraced this approach recently when 
they decided to ban the IoToys device Cayla due to its (proclaimed) inherent 
security flaws.188 Germany’s Federal Network Agency even took this 
approach a step further and classified Cayla as an “illegal unlicensed radio 
device,” meaning that parents who possessed this doll might be prosecuted 
and face up to two-years imprisonment for possessing a banned surveillance 
device.189
This Article does not support such solutions as an agenda, and they are also 
highly unlikely in the United States. Beyond the potential benefits to children, 
IoToys could be valuable for technological developments and innovation.190
This solution might negatively affect the progress of knowledge as flow of 
information could enhance innovation. Datafication could develop technology 
for analysis and “business models to utilize the derived information,”191 and it 
could further “lead to social benefits and the enhancement of social welfare.”192
Thus, heavily regulating the flow of information, let alone banning IoToys
devices altogether, could stifle innovation and should be carefully examined.193
Instead of banning IoToys, policymakers should consider other less-
restrictive legal measures, which could lessen the risks that IoToys entails while 
preserving its benefits. To achieve such a balance, policymakers must combine 
                                                                                                                     
CONSUMER L. (May 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1000226 [https://perma.cc/4N6Q-
P34B] (surveying the United States regulatory framework for consumer protection).
187 World: Americas: Furby Toy or Furby Spy?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 1999), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/254094.stm [https://perma.cc/4NXZ-B7HY].
188 Dakshayani Shankar, Germany Bans Talking Doll Cayla over Security, Hacking 
Fears, NBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/germany-bans-
talking-doll-cayla-over-security-hacking-fears-n722816 [https://perma.cc/9L5W-6TKX].
189 Id. Notably, Germany also recently banned children’s smartwatches. Jane Wakefield, 
Germany Bans Children’s Smartwatches, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.bbc.com
/news/technology-42030109 [https://perma.cc/J899-TLG6].
190 For a comprehensive analysis of the privacy-innovation debate, see Tal Z. Zarsky, 
The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 115, 119–21 (2015). In the 
context of big data, see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–
27 (2013).
191 Zarsky, supra note 190, at 118.
192 Id.; accord Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 243–51 (2013).
193 See Zarsky, supra note 190, at 118 n.5, 119.
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ex ante and ex post measures, by allowing developments in IoToys, while setting 
a framework in which these toys operate, are manufactured, and are sold, and 
especially how, by whom, and for which purposes data are used. Essentially, 
COPPA regulation attempts to do precisely this, but as previously mentioned, it 
requires far-reaching modifications to its requirements.
1. Raising Awareness
Any legal guardian, even without purchasing IoToys devices, must be aware 
of their potential implications. They must certainly understand the risks of 
IoToys to information privacy and security by understanding the information 
the OSP collects, “how that information will be used,” “whether it will be 
shared,” and if so with whom, and “how long the information will be 
retained.”194 Parents and guardians must assume a position enabling them to 
make educated decisions regarding their children’s privacy. They have to be 
aware of these toys’ implications, as their children might also become secondary 
users, namely by playing with an IoToys device without their parents’
knowledge or consent.195
Awareness can be promoted in various ways. One way is to reduce 
information gaps through regulation-by-information. Under this regulatory 
approach, toy manufacturers and OSPs will be obliged to apprise consumers of 
IoToys’s privacy risks, thereby reducing the disclosers’ power to control the 
disclosees by granting them informed choice on whether to use these
                                                                                                                     
194 See CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 2.
195 The notions of awareness and consent in IoToys might be also perceived as tricky 
due to secondary users. What happens, for instance, when a child uses his friend’s IoToys 
device, consented for use only by the parent of the friend? Indeed, a class action revolving 
secondary users in Hello Barbie was filed against ToyTalk, Inc. and Mattel in the California 
Superior Court. The class action alleged, inter alia, that OSPs violated COPPA as the IoToys 
device captured the voices of other children whose parents had not consented (Hello Barbie 
recorded conversations of the plaintiff while attending a friend’s birthday party). Notice of 
Removal at 1, 2, Archer-Hayes v. Toytalk, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02111-JAK-PLA (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 29, 2016). From a legal certainty perspective, this case was unfortunately voluntarily 
dismissed, leaving void the applicability to secondary use within IoToys. See Stipulation of 
Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice at 1, Archer-Hayes v. Toytalk, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-2111-
JAK-PLA (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2016). It is generally still unclear whether a secondary use of 
an IoToys device will be deemed as personal identifiable information under COPPA, as an 
unnamed and unidentified voice is not necessarily “personal information” (unlike the child 
who owns the toy). Practically, if we take ToyTalk’s privacy policy as an example, allowing 
other people to use the service via their account is considered a confirmation of the right to 
consent on their behalf to ToyTalk’s collection, use, and disclosure of their personal 
information. Alex B. Lipton, Note, Privacy Protections for Secondary Users of 
Communications-Capturing Technologies, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 396, 406 (2016) (“By 
allowing other people to use the Service via your account, you are confirming that you have 
the right to consent on their behalf to ToyTalk’s collection, use and disclosure of their 
personal information as described below.” (quoting Privacy Policy Terms of Use FAQ,
TOYTALK, https://toytalk.com/hellobarbie/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/A6XC-59SM]). 
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products.196 While COPPA promotes this type of regulation by its notice 
requirement,197 it generates insufficient awareness regarding IoToys, as it fails 
to acknowledge the difference between using a website and playing with a toy. 
Merely placing a notice on a website will hardly raise awareness.198 When the 
internet is embedded in the operation of devices, direct exposure to a website 
does not exist, even if OSPs maintain one. Thus, the existence of a notice in a 
website regarding the collection, retention and use of information does little in 
itself to detail the rationale behind the notice requirement. The notice must 
appear on the toy’s packaging and on online platforms like the app that is used 
to set up the toy. But on its own, this requirement is still insufficient to properly
raise awareness.
One of the main problems of the notice requirement in terms of awareness 
concerns the known practice of confusing users with long and incomprehensible 
policies. Regarding IoToys, the FBI advises parents to carefully read disclosures 
and privacy policies.199 But practice shows that this is unlikely to occur. As may 
be drawn from terms of service (ToS) agreements and end-user license 
agreements (EULAs),200 most consumers do not bother to read them201 and they 
are usually long, broad,202 and written in a legal language almost 
incomprehensible to most people, as are privacy policies or notices.203 Most 
                                                                                                                     
196 See generally BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, MORE, supra note 115 (arguing that 
mandated disclosures are ineffective); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, Failure, supra note 115
(discussing the historical use of mandated disclosures).
197 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(a) (2012).
198 As currently regulated under COPPA and codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) 
(2012).
199 See Consumer Notice: Internet-Connected Toys Could Present Privacy Concerns for 
Children, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR. (July 17,
2017), https://www.ic3.gov/media/2017/170717.aspx [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
200 The use of ToS and EULAs are merely to exemplify how individuals treat vast 
amounts of information online. It should be stressed that this Article does not argue that these 
agreements are similar to privacy policies. While terms of use are the province of contract 
law, privacy policies seem currently to be mainly the province of the FTC. See Solove & 
Hartzog, supra note 83, at 589. For attempts to enforce privacy policies as contracts, see, for 
example, In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–18 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199–1200 (D.N.D. 2004). 
201 See Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 930 (2013); Ben-Shahar & 
Schneider, Failure, supra note 115, at 665–78; Solove, supra note 88, at 1885.
202 See, e.g., Garry L. Founds, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?,
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 100 (1999); Daniel B. Ravicher, Facilitating Collaborative Software 
Development: The Enforceability of Mass-Market Public Software Licenses, 5 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 11, 12 (2000).
203 For studies on privacy notices, see, for example, NISSENBAUM, supra note 77, at 105; 
Annie I. Anton et al., Financial Privacy Policies and the Need for Standardization, 2 IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY 36, 42–44 (2004); Aleecia McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost 
of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008); George R. 
Milne & Mary J. Culnan, Strategies for Reducing Online Privacy Risks: Why Consumers 
Read (or Don’t Read) Online Privacy Notices, 18 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 15, 20–21 
(2004); Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW 
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people do not see, read or understand them, and they might also be changed 
frequently.204 Even shortening these policies might only insert marginal 
improvements to make them more comprehensible,205 and they might also leave 
out important information to make any consent truly informed.206 Essentially, 
individuals already experience information flooding and are unlikely to spend 
time or effort on reading these polices.207
Even if parents do receive full information on IoToys practices, privacy self-
management—at least in its current form—is insufficient to raise awareness 
efficiently.208 It is beset with cognitive failures and structural problems such as 
impediments to the parents’ ability to adequately assess the costs and benefits 
of the information they receive.209 Thus, information is generally substantially 
insufficient to reduce these risks. Cognitive abilities are required to understand 
something that may be highly complex in terms of informational privacy.
Within this regulatory framework, at the very least COPPA must be more 
precise. Assuming that the policy of these OSPs permits collection and sharing 
of information, they must be obliged to be concise and clear on how information 
is used and by whom.210 A clear and understandable notice on how OSPs use 
                                                                                                                     
RES. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-
americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is [https://perma.cc/FD92-3XD5].
204 Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and 
Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 491 (2015); accord
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999) (“No one has the 
time or patience to read through cumbersome documents describing obscure rules for 
controlling data.”); Ohm, supra note 201, at 930; Solove, supra note 88, at 1885.
205 See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1032–33 (2012).
206 See Solove, supra note 88, at 1885.
207 See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 
1369 (2011) (“[E]ven accurate disclosure of information may be ineffective if the 
information is too . . . overwhelming to be useful.”); see also Karen Bradshaw Schulz, 
Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755, 756 (2015) (describing the cause of “information 
overload”).
208 See Solove, supra note 88, at 1883–93.
209 As suggested by Professor Daniel Solove, cognitive problems arise from four 
aspects:
(1) [P]eople do not read privacy policies; (2) if people read them, they do not understand 
them, (3) if people read them, they often lack enough background knowledge to make 
an informed choice; and (4) if people read them, understand them, and can make an 
informed choice, their choice might be skewed by various decisionmaking difficulties.
Id. at 1888.
210 It should be insufficient to declare that information might be shared “with third-
parties” without listing who these third-parties are and what the purpose of this information 
sharing is. For more on the problem of vagueness, see Reidenberg et al., supra note 204, at 
518–19. Relating to their smart bear toy, Fisher-Price mentions on their website that “NO
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE DATA is transmitted by Smart Toy.” Yadron, supra note 
161 (describing how the toy was able to be hacked, revealing personal information about 
users).
434 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
such information,211 and their disclosure practices, must be prominently visible 
to anyone purchasing the toy; also, parents should be reminded of these matters 
periodically by accessible communication means such as email. The notice must 
explicitly spell out the potential risks to users when agreeing to the policy.212
Any vendor of these toys must first make sure that parents understand the risks, 
and what they are consenting to, at the point of sale.213
Furthermore, sellers should be obliged to place simplified and clear privacy 
labels on the package.214 Beyond lucid warnings on IoToys devices’ packaging, 
it would be efficient to clearly signal how the toys protect privacy and comply 
with COPPA. Under this program, OSPs that implement sufficient measures to 
protect children’s privacy should be encouraged to display a privacy seal on the 
toy. This solution exists in the market, as toys can be certified “COPPA 
compliant” by the FTC or other organizations, for example, by the kidSAFE 
Seal Program—a children’s privacy certification program approved by the 
FTC.215 Hello Barbie is currently a member of such a program.216 While not 
perfect, seal programs are generally an efficient method to alert consumers to 
the potential risks of IoToys devices that do not have such a seal.217 It could 
                                                                                                                     
211 The United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
advised the FTC to suggest that toymakers will be required to “use clear, plain language to 
inform parents about the information the toys collect and how that information is used.”
CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 2.
212 See Steinberg, supra note 28; see also CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57,
at 15 (“Toymakers should also disclose in plain language the information that is collected 
from or about a child instead of burying it in their privacy policies.”); cf. Lobosco, supra
note 12 (quoting a Mattel spokeswoman that Hello Barbie conforms to COPPA).
213 See KIDS & THE CONNECTED HOME, supra note 4, at 13.
214 See Steinberg, supra note 28; see also CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57,
at 15 (suggesting that providing the basics of what information is collected and how it is used 
conspicuously and in clear terms on a toy’s packaging would allow parents to be more 
informed about their children’s privacy and security).
215 The kidSAFE Seal Program is designed for children-friendly websites and 
technologies, including “online game sites, educational services, virtual worlds, social 
networks, mobile apps, tablet devices, connected toys, and other similar online and 
interactive services.” The service includes a list of products that meet their online safety 
and/or privacy standards. About Our Program, SAMET PRIVACY, LLC, KIDSAFE® SEAL 
PROGRAM, https://www.kidsafeseal.com/aboutourprogram.html [https://perma.cc/H3LX-
RRLR]. One of the seals is an FTC-approved COPPA certification program called the 
“kidSAFE+ COPPA” seal. Beyond basic safety rules, this seal has six additional 
requirements: “Neutral age questions, Parental notice and consent procedures, Parental 
access to child’s personal information, Data integrity and security procedures, COPPA-
compliant privacy policy, [and] COPPA oversight and enforcement by the kidSAFE® Seal 
Program.” About Our Seals, SAMET PRIVACY, LLC, KIDSAFE® SEAL PROGRAM,
https://www.kidsafeseal.com/aboutourseals.html [https://perma.cc/82HW-4VBR].
216 Official Membership Page, SAMET PRIVACY, LLC, KIDSAFE® SEAL PROGRAM,
http://www.kidsafeseal.com/certifiedproducts/toytalk_hellobarbie_device.html 
[https://perma.cc/4LF8-4W7D] (noting that Hello Barbie is kidSAFE+ COPPA certified).
217 Compare with TRUSTe, a nonprofit organization, “the first online privacy seal 
program” in the United States. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 6; Hertzel, supra note 
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promote consumer trust, thereby persuading consumers to purchase only IoToys
devices that meet FTC standards. 
The state, too, should promote awareness. Policymakers must invest in 
heightening awareness of the potential implications of IoToys. As previously 
noted, it is crucial for all legal guardians to understand the ramifications of 
playing with an IoToys device, as their children might become secondary 
users.218 The state should therefore invest in advertisements and other forms of 
education that clearly explain their potential risks.219 One such effort that could 
be improved is the FBI’s consumer notice for internet-connected toys, which 
warns of potential risks to children’s privacy.220 While important, the FBI’s
suggested steps are unlikely be taken by average parents, even if they are 
exposed to the warnings.221 Thus, raising awareness must be more meaningful 
and use practical forms of communication to advise the general public on the 
privacy risks of IoToys. Still, even awareness will be fairly limited to properly 
regulate IoToys.
2. Redefining Choice
Being alerted to and comprehending the risks, parents should be able to 
decide whether to consent to the practices that IoToys entails. COPPA currently 
promotes exercising “verifiable parental consent.”222 Generally, this form of 
privacy self-management is insufficient for IoToys.223 The efficacy of a notice 
and choice mechanism has largely been contested because, inter alia, it can
uninform or misinform consumers,224 it is “impractical” and ineffective,225 and 
                                                                                                                     
69, at 445. TRUSTe required all “members or licensees [to] disclose to users their 
information collection practices in exchange for the right to display a privacy seal on their 
Web site.” Hertzel, supra note 69, at 445; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 
6.
218 See supra note 195.
219 Cf. Melanie A. Wakefield et al., Use of Mass Media Campaigns to Change Health 
Behaviour, 376 LANCET 1261 (2010) (describing successful state advertising about public 
health, including warnings about tobacco, fast food, and risky sexual behavior).
220 See Public Service Announcement, supra note 199 (advising parents to take steps to 
protect their children’s privacy).
221 See Solove, supra note 88, at 1884.
222 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3(b), 312.5 (2012).
223 For a comprehensive review of the efficacy of notice and choice frameworks, see 
Reidenberg et al., supra note 204, at 489–97. For criticism on the efficacy of the notice and 
choice mechanism to regulate information privacy, see generally Fred H. Cate, Protecting 
Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765 (2010).
224 Users are “uninformed—or misinformed, as people rarely see, read, or understand 
privacy policies.” Reidenberg et al., supra note 204, at 491.
225 The notice and choice mechanism is considered impractical due to the amount of 
privacy policies online (which might also change from time to time), users’ lack of 
knowledge of how third parties use data, users’ inability to understand the effects of future 
aggregation of their data, and how users suffer from “bounded rationality and cognitive 
biases.” Id. at 492–94 (quoting Ohm, supra note 201, at 931).
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it creates undesirable externalities.226 Generally, individuals make incorrect 
assumptions on how their privacy is protected and misconceive of how the data 
are used; many lack expertise in assessing the consequences of consent.227
If we accept consent as a proper form of regulation, policymakers must 
acknowledge that consent deals with IoToys insufficiently in its current form. 
Due to the potential risks of IoToys, regulators must require OSPs to do more 
than merely make “reasonable efforts” to obtain such consent.228 Verification 
of parental consent must cross a higher threshold than that which COPPA 
currently sets. Methods of obtaining verifiable parental consent should 
necessitate parents actively calling or video-conferencing trained personnel who 
could assess if they understand the policy to which they are consenting.
Policymakers could also oblige companies to delimit choice of privacy 
preferences. They can set various restrictions on consent to data collection and 
retention, such as an obligatory opt-in mechanism, where by default, companies 
do not collect data from toys and do so only upon enabling such an option.229
They could also reverse the choice and notice mechanism default so that 
consumers are obliged to signal their privacy preferences to the information 
collectors, not the reverse.230 They could also oblige companies to offer 
consumers a choice between more costly services that protect their privacy and 
cheaper services that protect it less.231
3. Data Minimization and Transparency
COPPA currently requires data minimization through proportionality and 
necessity. It prohibits conditioning a child’s online activity on the child’s
disclosure of more personal information than is reasonably necessary for 
participation in such activity.232 While this requirement requires OSPs to collect 
                                                                                                                     
226 The notice and choice mechanism potentially creates externalities because the 
disclosure of information by one individual could lead to disclosure of information of other 
individuals without their consent. Id. at 495.
227 See Solove, supra note 88, at 1885–86.
228 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(9) (2012) (describing the current requirements in the United 
States).
229 But see Solove, supra note 88, at 1898–99 (describing the failure of opt-in consent).
230 See Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s
Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639, 654 (2015).
231 For example, AT&T offers that option to its customers. Jon Brodkin, AT&T Charges 
$29 More for Gigabit Fiber That Doesn’t Watch Your Web Browsing, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 
16, 2015), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/02/att-charges-29-more-
for-gigabit-fiber-that-doesnt-watch-your-web-browsing/ [https://perma.cc/GSM6-ZKBY]. 
This solution, however, has a social impact, as it implies that wealthy individuals deserve 
higher privacy protection than non-wealthy ones. Sophia Cope & Jeremy Gillula, Opinion, 
AT&T Is Putting a Price on Privacy. That Is Outrageous, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/20/att-price-on-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/WZ2S-CHJQ].
232 15 U.S.C § 6502(b)(1)(C) (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3(d), 312.7 (2012).
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only data that are necessary for the purposes for which they are collected, 
without proper transparency, it is extremely difficult to assess their datamining 
practices, data retention, and data transfers to third parties.
COPPA must be much more precise on data minimization. The use of vague 
language for keeping recordings on the merits of “data analysis purposes”233
should not qualify as fulfilling this requirement. Policymakers must oblige 
companies to limit their data collection to what is required for the toy’s core 
functions.234 While defining core functions might not be easy, especially for 
IoToys devices that depend on advanced computational skills like machine 
learning, the default should still be set at no data collection unless these OSPs 
prove to the FTC that it is essential for the core functions of the toy. 
Accordingly, policymakers should set limits on data retention and data 
sharing.235 Even if OSPs allow parents to change the privacy settings of IoToys
devices, on its own this would be insufficient to mitigate IoToys’s risks.236
Currently, COPPA requires that an OSP retain personal information “only as 
long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information 
was collected.”237 Policymakers must clarify this vague current requirement. 
OSPs must be obliged to clarify to consumers how long data is stored and when 
it will be deleted. As for data sharing, OSPs should not be allowed to share data
with any third party unless the OSP proves that it has full control of how that 
data is used and an ability to delete it when necessary.
Clearly, ensuring that OSPs comply with the data minimization 
requirements necessitates some form of oversight. Transparently explaining the 
need for data use might not be easy. OSPs might have to disclose trade secrets, 
and even if they do not, they might not know beforehand what data will be 
needed in the future. These difficulties, however, do not completely rule out 
oversight measures. The obvious candidate to perform such oversight is the 
FTC; it could examine OSPs’ practices, under secrecy if needed, and decide 
whether they comply with COPPA requirements. The Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation actually suggested FTC monitoring of 
the connected toy space and exercising authority when appropriate.238 This 
                                                                                                                     
233 See, e.g., TOYTALK, Privacy, supra note 54.
234 See CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 2, 15; Emily McReynolds et al., 
Public Comment, Toys That Listen: A Study of Parents, Children, and Internet-Connected 
Toys (Nov. 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2017/11/
00038-141895.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2Q4-WMZW] (suggesting that toymakers limit how 
they collect and store data to allay parental privacy concerns).
235 CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 2; McReynolds et al., supra note 
234.
236 Although a Senate committee report recommends for the FTC to advise parents to 
change the privacy settings of the toy to limit the amount of personal information that the 
toy collects and transmits and allow the toy to collect only information necessary for the toy 
to properly function, it might not be within the toy’s options. See CHILDREN’S CONNECTED 
TOYS, supra note 57, at 2.
237 16 C.F.R. § 312.10 (2012).
238 CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 16.
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oversight, however, must also be implemented carefully, as it grants a state 
agent surveillance powers over individuals; as history shows, these powers can 
be misused by the state.239 It would be wiser to invest a non-state data protection 
authority with such oversight powers.
4. Toy and Information Security 
Properly securing the obtained data is naturally critical for safeguarding 
children’s privacy. COPPA currently requires OSPs to maintain reasonable 
security policies.240 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Office of Oversight and Investigations’s advice to parents to 
strengthen their passwords and frequently update the toy’s software,241 while 
important, is still insufficient for data security. This requirement must be 
clarified and recalibrated, as it does not greatly advance IoToys’s security levels. 
Prior to such recommendations, one may at least presume that legal 
intervention might not be needed when market players possess high incentives 
to secure their products and services.242 Arguably, low security measures and 
data breaches could result in damage to toymakers’ reputations and monetary 
losses from fines, lawsuits, or simply losing customers. The state, in fact,
encourages parents to respond actively to IoToys’s security measures. The 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Office of 
Oversight and Investigations advises parents to examine companies’ prior 
history of security breaches.243 The FBI has further recommended that parents 
examine “the toy’s Internet and device connection security measures” and probe 
“any known reported security issues,” “use toys in environments with trusted 
and secured Wi-Fi Internet access,” “[r]esearch where user data is stored . . . and 
whether any publicly available reporting exists on their reputation and [stance 
on] cyber security,” and “[e]nsure the toy is turned off . . . when not in use.”244
Prima facie, IoToys manufacturers and OSPs would wish to invest in 
measures to protect their products, services, reputation, share price, and 
customers from harm. As this market-based approach suggests, with proper 
incentives, the modality of law is not needed—absent substantial market failures 
                                                                                                                     
239 For more on surveillance in the digital age, see generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA
AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD
(2015); Niva Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: Cyber Challenges to Civil 
Liberties, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2016).
240 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.3(e), 312.8 (2012).
241 CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 2, 16.
242 This assumption is often attributed to Adam Smith’s coining of the “invisible hand,”
i.e., that market players acting in their own self-interest will react to demand, which reflects 
the preferences of members of society and thus promotes the social good. See ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Sálvio Marcelo 
Soares ed., 4th ed. 2007) (1776).
243 See CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 2, 15 (recommending FTC 
advice to parents).
244 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 199.
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that would prevent the market from reaching its anticipated equilibrium point. 
But as shown next, while the market as a modality to regulate cybersecurity 
could be an important component of any solution,245 it is insufficient on its own 
to regulate IoToys properly due to the existence of market failures.
First, the market-based approach’s reliance on consumers’ discontent with 
security measures is due to failures. It presumes no cognitive failures, no 
information gaps, and the presence of expertise to evaluate security measures 
properly. Even if the state adds regulatory requirements of disclosure like 
security standards or data breach notifications246 to reduce information gaps—
commonly termed the regulation through disclosure approach247—this will not 
necessarily lead to a market response.248 It might be too vague for consumers to 
fully understand because of the aforementioned cognitive biases or simply not 
be fully comprehensible without substantial expertise in cybersecurity.
In addition, consumers may lack the ability to indicate their discontent with 
cybersecurity measures in the IoToys market as it is not fully competitive. This 
market currently operates with limited competition—controlled by key market 
players like Mattel and ToyTalk. Their products and services are not necessarily 
similar to their competitors’, hence are not fully substitutive. From a child’s
perspective, it is fairly intuitive that not all children will view Hello Barbie as 
equivalent to Cayla. So without a fully competitive market it is difficult to 
assume that consumers could markedly alter these companies’ security 
policies.249 Notably, however, IoToys devices are certainly not a necessity, and 
parents’ discontent could be realized simply by their not purchasing any IoToys
device.
As the market in itself will be insufficient to promote optimal cybersecurity 
measures, legal intervention is most likely required. Recalibration of COPPA 
must begin by expanding beyond maintaining reasonable procedures to protect 
the confidentiality, security and integrity of personal information collected from 
                                                                                                                     
245 Professor Lawrence Lessig suggested four modalities that could regulate behavior: 
market, social norms, technology (code), and law. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0
120–37 (2006); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 116–73 (2004).
246 Data breach notifications statues in the United States are currently state legislated 
and usually require private and government entities to notify individuals of security breaches 
of information involving personally identifiable information with notable exceptions like 
encrypted data. See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 287, 297 (2014).
247 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999).
248 See, e.g., Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity 
Theft?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256, 280–81 (2011) (concluding that data breach 
disclosure laws’ efficacy is lower because consumers do not respond to them by taking any 
action). For more on data breach notification regulation, see Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. 
Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007).
249 See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
1503, 1517 (2013) (“[S]trategically significant firms in uncompetitive markets are less likely 
to adequately invest in cyber-security than ordinary firms in competitive markets.”).
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children. Policymakers must set a higher threshold than “reasonable” and 
demand that toy manufacturers and OSPs comply with high security standards 
for the IoToys device and the stored data. They must establish security standards
that OSPs and third parties must meet to be able to collect and retain data. These 
measures must also address the threat of real-time interception of data, not 
merely its collection and storage. OSPs must be obliged to use cutting-edge 
security measures that will stop—or at least substantially reduce—the 
possibility of hacking the toy and the stored data.
Inter alia, these measures might include requirements to meet predetermined 
security standards, conduct security audits, implement bug bounty programs,250
use strong encryption standards, and actively update security measures.251 The 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Office of 
Oversight and Investigations has in fact suggested that toymakers build in 
effective security from the start.252 These suggestions should become 
obligatory, but also be further clarified. Policymakers must clarify exactly what 
robust security means and make sure that companies are subjected to periodic 
external audits as part of the suggested oversight. Beyond the use of strong 
encryption, they should incentivize toymakers to implement anonymization 
measures,253 differential privacy,254 and any other PET tools,255 as long as the 
FTC can verify their applicability to safeguarding children’s privacy.
                                                                                                                     
250 ToyTalk, for instance, currently “offers a monetary bounty for reports of qualifying
security vulnerabilities.” See PullString: Bug Bounty Program, HACKERONE,
https://hackerone.com/toytalk [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal] (last updated Apr. 
26, 2018).
251 See KIDS & THE CONNECTED HOME, supra note 4, at 15; CHILDREN’S CONNECTED 
TOYS, supra note 57, at 2.
252 See CHILDREN’S CONNECTED TOYS, supra note 57, at 15.
253 Realizing that speech recognition must obtain large quantities of data to improve, 
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Sorcher, The Internet of Toys Raises New Privacy and Security Concerns for Families,
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254 Differential privacy relates to a method by which noise is added systematically to 
results of data queries so “no single person’s inclusion or exclusion from the database can
significantly affect the results of queries.” Jane Bambauer et al., Fool’s Gold: An Illustrated 
Critique of Differential Privacy, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701, 703 (2014). Using 
differential privacy correctly should assure that no user could infer anything about another 
user. Id. For an analysis and critique of differential privacy, see id.
255 See, e.g., Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, supra note 174 (detailing 
a PET that allows companies to “express their privacy practices in a standard format that can 
be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents”).
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5. Effective Enforcement
The FTC’s option to sanction COPPA violations is in itself insufficient to 
be considered effective enforcement.256 The FTC must be more involved in ex
ante and ex post enforcement practices. From an ex ante perspective, the FTC 
must closely oversee the implementation of privacy policies in practice, and not 
merely rely on OSPs’ statements. This became evident with the data breach of 
VTech: the FTC learned ex post that the company did not comply with its own 
privacy policy, which falsely stated that it used encryption when in fact it did
not encrypt any information.257 Even without adhering to direct oversight, at the 
very least the FTC must investigate and rectify instances where reporters show 
that an IoToys device is not secure enough.258 They must use reliable 
mechanisms to provide substantial sanctions against noncompliance with 
regulations or simply not approve marketing or sale on the grounds of children’s
safety.259
These measures must be complemented with ex post measures such as 
imposing steep fines as a potential deterrent. True, the effect of deterrence might 
be disputable in general;260 nonetheless, the FTC should exercise its vested 
powers of enforcement to impose the highest fines possible.261 Sanctioning 
companies like VTech to the tune of $650,000262 for a substantive data breach 
is unlikely to advance the deterrence rationale, considering its $689.4 million 
gross profits in 2017.263 OSPs must not see fines as costs of doing business and 
                                                                                                                     
256 The FTC acknowledged this ability to effectively enforce COPPA as a critical 
component to protecting privacy online. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at i.
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Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC Act, supra note 163.
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262 See Electronic Toy Maker VTech Settles FTC Allegations That It Violated 
Children’s Privacy Law and the FTC Act, supra note 163.
263 See Annual Report 2017, VTECH HOLDING LTD., 6 (2007), https://www.vtech.com/
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should reflect further on the gravity of poor security measures. Policymakers 
should thus implant in the FTC more substantial regulatory teeth. This would 
enable the Commission’s fines not merely to reflect the level of consumer loss 
but rather to sanction violations, with fines as percentages of annual global 
turnover.264 If the FTC continues to act as a data protection authority, 
policymakers must further invest in and expand the purview of the Division of 
Privacy and Identity Protection—the body devoted to privacy issues—to issuing 
high fines and conducting meaningful oversight of OSP practices.265
Legal intervention is thus greatly needed to better secure informational 
privacy of children in the IoToys market. COPPA regulation must frequently be 
updated to better address the risks that IoToys entails, and frequently revisited 
in view of technological changes that could affect the risks in these toys. For 
example, the future IoToys market might expand the current children-to-toy 
interaction to children-to-children. If, for instance, Hello Barbies begin 
exchanging information, children might also be exposed to harassment in the 
form of cyberbullying, along with further dangers to their privacy.266
All in all, COPPA should become more oriented to the privacy risks of 
IoToys, and policymakers must not presume that the potential risks to children’s
privacy from being online do not change over time. Children’s privacy must be 
taken more seriously, and the ways technological developments could 
negatively affect it must be acknowledged. If an IoToys device increases the 
risks to children’s privacy, parents must also become more involved in 
safeguarding their children.267 Their involvement, however, should not be 
treated lightly, as it bears on important normative questions that must be further 
addressed: what are the implications of the tradeoff between children’s security 
and children’s privacy—or stated differently—between parents’ empowerment 
and children’s protection?268 More particularly, should children’s right to 
privacy be viewed only as a right from third-parties or also from their 
parents?269 In other words, how can we ensure children’s privacy outside their 
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household but also not completely abolish it within what they view as their safe 
place? 
V. TAKING CHILDREN’S PRIVACY SERIOUSLY
Parents have the responsibility to safeguard their offspring from dangers. 
They must make decisions regarding various aspects of their children’s lives, 
especially their health, development, and safety. To do so, parents might oblige 
children, inter alia, to “play in rubber-cushioned playgrounds, use sanitizing gel, 
sit in car seats, and wear helmets and kneepads while riding their bicycles.”270
They might also become closely involved in their lives and even use sensors and 
monitors to assure their safety.271 While parents might always have been 
involved in their children’s lives to some extent, researchers have witnessed an 
increase in parents’ involvement since the mid-1980s. To date, it has developed 
into a phenomenon dubbed helicopter parenting, smothering mothering, or 
child-centered parenting, among other proposed names.272 Essentially, children 
today are probably “the most watched over generation” in history.273
The notion that parents nowadays should be more protective could be 
important and perhaps challenged—but nonetheless beyond the scope of this 
Article. The purpose of this part is rather modest. It seeks to identify how the 
regulatory framework that governs IoToys subjects children to this form of 
parenting and even takes it a step farther than the regulation of online activities 
through websites. It discusses the tension between children’s protective rights, 
like the right to be safeguarded from harms, and their participatory rights to 
make decisions.274 It also further seeks to discuss the privacy protection 
paradox,275 namely that children’s privacy cannot be safeguarded properly 
when parents obtain tools—that IoToys makers are encouraged to provide—to 
constantly spy on them, when the rationale behind such tools is outside the 
regulatory framework.
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A. Parenting in the IoToys Era
Parenting generally involves a balance of risk management.276 Many 
parents might view good or responsible parenting as being all-knowing, which 
requires them to monitor their children’s behavior.277 They might monitor their 
children even before birth, using ultrasound screening to detect fetal anomalies,
see their unborn baby’s movements, and hear its sounds.278 After birth, parents 
will often monitor their children’s behavior and development directly, by 
watching and listening to them, or indirectly, by means of technology, such as 
wearable devices and various types of sensors and monitors.279 Parents might 
even monitor their children when another caregiver is present by using, inter 
alia, cameras hidden inside another object (“nanny cams”).280 When their 
children are old enough to interact with the digital world, parents might monitor 
their conduct by various methods. Parents’ consent to their children using the 
internet, for instance, might require imposing rules and restrictions such as 
placing the computer in a shared space281 or obliging their children to share the 
content of their conversations and even their usernames and passwords.282
Parents might also embrace social approaches, like by educating children to 
share what they are doing or by using technical tools like monitoring 
software.283 Essentially, many parents will attempt to strengthen their control 
and track almost everything their children do offline and online.284
It is generally uncontested that keeping an eye on children, especially young 
ones, is extremely important at any time, let alone in the digital age.285 Parents 
might fear that their children’s data will be misused and might also be alert to 
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their exposure to harmful content, cyberbullying, and inappropriate contact.286
These fears might be further enhanced by perceiving their children’s
interactions as less visible to them online than in the kinetic world.287 Under this 
assumption, parents will use technology to monitor their children online as a
responsive measure against the risks of technology.288
While parents’ mediation is effective in reducing online risks to their 
children is disputable,289 these fears are real, and children’s safety should be on 
the agenda of any parent. As discussed throughout this Article, IoToys could 
clearly expose children to various risks, and parents might wish to intensify 
control over their children’s play because of these risks and the invisibility of 
their actions from their point of view. COPPA regulation deals directly with 
protecting children’s privacy from third parties misusing their data. With the 
privacy risks of the internet in mind, American regulators obliged OSPs to 
provide a right of parental review, which includes granting parents the right to 
review the collected information.290
Some OSPs took the right of parental review a step further in IoToys, by 
providing parents real-time access to their children’s recordings.291 In some 
instances they could even be notified when a new recording was made.292 At 
first sight, this move seems to strengthen parents’ control in the IoToys context, 
and therefore should be encouraged, as it acknowledges the potential risks to the 
sensitive information that children might convey to third parties. The FBI even 
publicly recommended that parents closely monitor their children’s activity with 
the toys.293 However, this form of monitoring is troubling from a privacy 
perspective.
While COPPA regulation supposedly increases children’s privacy by 
strengthening parents’ control over the disclosure of sensitive information, it 
might further jeopardize children’s privacy from a different perspective: the 
children’s. Due to the characteristics of many IoToys devices, children might 
become convinced that the IoToys device is their best friend—even 
anthropomorphize it—and consequently share their deepest secrets with it.294
Perhaps obviously, the regulatory framework does not deem such secrets 
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sensitive information per se, as safeguarding this information from third parties 
might not seem important. OSPs that sometimes make it easy for parents to share 
IoToys devices’ recordings through social media like Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter further demonstrate the secrets’ proclaimed non-sensitive nature.295
From the children’s perspective, however, their secrets are probably the most 
valuable privacy rights they own.296
Children’s view of privacy will probably not change how policymakers 
conceive personal information. It should not, however, promote parental 
monitoring when such behavior could further risk children’s conception of 
privacy. The main rationale behind COPPA was not to foster parental 
surveillance of their children online but to aid parents who wanted their children 
to take advantage of the internet, while obtaining better control of the practices 
of the websites they visited and the information requested from them.297 IoToys 
essentially could become a powerful surveillance device for parents, who could 
now extract all their children’s secrets without their knowledge or consent. It 
designates parents as surveillance officers and normalizes such conduct for both 
parents and their children—when they become aware of it in the future. It further 
illustrates important normative questions in the realm of children’s privacy that 
are usually less discussed in the literature: What are the implications of 
constantly monitoring children’s privacy? Should children possess the right to 
privacy from their parents? Children lack autonomy over most aspects of their 
lives, so why should IoToys differ?
B. Child Development and Privacy
While monitoring children’s play in IoToys could be important in lessening 
the privacy risks they entail, ubiquitous parental surveillance carries potentially 
negative consequences closely linked to their development and well-being. At 
early stages of life like infanthood, this might be less evident, as children lack a 
“theory of mind”; namely, they are unable to distinguish self from other.298
After that stage at approximately age four, children learn that they can keep 
secrets from their parents.299 That is when the potentially negative effect of 
ubiquitous surveillance begins.
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The world’s perception of children has been the subject of many scholarly 
debates, from Jean Piaget’s development stages and process300 to Donald 
Winnicott’s monumental work on stages of child development and practice of 
childhood play.301 A key example is Erik Erikson’s work, which stresses the 
importance of the years from middle childhood (approximately ages six to ten)
to early adolescence (approximately ages eleven to fourteen) for children’s
development.302 Erikson argued, inter alia, that these stages are important for 
developing a sense of self-esteem and individuality.303 Within these 
psychological assessments, play itself is also is an important part of how 
children learn about the world, and parents’ intrusion could impede their 
learning.304 Control over personal information is also crucial for children’s
development, as its absence could affect the adolescent’s dignity and 
personhood and the development of intimate relationships.305 Especially 
regarding IoToys, acknowledging the psychological importance of keeping 
secrets should not be easily dismissed.
Regardless of IoToys, one might argue that it is within the parents’
prerogative to determine the extent to which they protect their children’s
privacy. Parents, for instance, could limit their children’s privacy in various 
ways, such as intruding in their personal space; knowing their personal 
interactions and associations, such as where and with whom they meet; and even 
requiring them to share their daily activities or their hopes, dreams, and fears.306
Arguably, the perceived risks of the digital world do not change the scope of 
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this prerogative, they indeed even intensify this need.307 By this approach, 
parents must be in greater control, especially in the digital world.308
From a legal perspective, parents are not normally prohibited from 
recording their children or even reading their secret diaries.309 Parents’
fundamental right to make decisions regarding the “care, custody, and control 
of their children”310 is even protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.311 Parents decide what is best for their children and 
whether to tell their children that parents can access their children’s
conversations. Under some circumstances, parents could even be immune to tort 
liability under the parental immunity doctrine.312 As a result, children do not 
possess the right to conceal information from their parents.313 COPPA 
regulation is troubling not because parents are generally entitled to spy on their 
children but because the regulatory framework encourages OSPs to furnish such 
measures.314 When parents buy their children an IoToys doll that is supposedly 
their children’s new best friend, the children may not suspect that their parents 
can eavesdrop on every conversation they have with the doll.315
Equally troubling is that parents’ depriving their children of privacy is 
becoming more invisible to their children than ever. Children are usually well 
aware of their parents’ control over their personal space. For instance, if parents 
decide that their children should not have privacy in their room, the children see 
at once that there is no door, and this might affect their behavior.316 They might 
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then seek ways to compensate for their privacy loss by a variety of methods,
like keeping a secret journal. The interpretation of COPPA regulation in the 
realm of IoToys effectively ends the children’s privacy boundary management 
by making interference invisible to them. It tricks them into believing that they 
can manage their privacy boundaries, while their parents constantly betray their 
trust. 
Such a form of invisible monitoring could have dire consequences for 
children’s trust and development and could also further shape their conception 
of privacy. One might argue that data collection and various forms of monitoring 
are mostly invisible to adults too, and perhaps these mechanisms actually better 
prepare children for the “real world.”317 This notion augments a well-known 
idiom about the demise of privacy in the digital age.318 This Article, however, 
posits differently. Privacy still matters, perhaps even more in the digital era. 
That children use the digital world does not imply that they do not care about 
their privacy.319 They simply view it differently from adults.320 For instance, 
children could view privacy simply as “aloneness,”321 “to hide secrets or special 
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things,” “to keep things to yourself,” or “not to talk to strangers.”322 They might 
value privacy as an enabler tool “to engage in identity play, seek advice, form 
relationships, and immerse themselves in peer communication.”323 When 
children experience constant surveillance by their parents, it shapes their 
understanding of privacy and limits their ability to make independent choices.324
Surveillance becomes even more important when their lives are already largely 
monitored by their parents,325 and further strengthens the traditional power 
structure of the “all-knowing” adult over the “all-learning” child.326
Parents should be generally aware of what their children do with IoToys
devices, but this should also be balanced properly by the child’s right to 
privacy.327 Their privacy rights—including from their parents—should not be 
easily discarded. Parents must take into account how these practices could affect 
their child’s well-being. Certainly, most children will not be able to comprehend 
the privacy risks of IoToys, as they are too abstract. Children might not even 
care if OSPs mine their data or use it for various purposes. This is why parents 
are tasked to consent on their child’s behalf. But being unaware that IoToys
devices record their conversations328 and that their parents have access to them, 
might change children’s attitudes toward their parents upon discovering the 
monitoring and the meaning of privacy.329
To clarify, this Article does not pretend to prefer one form of parenting over 
another. Perhaps personal safety almost always triumphs over privacy, in which 
case parental autonomy should be almost absolute. If parents wish to constantly 
monitor their children’s behavior, with proper analysis of the tradeoff between 
their safety and their well-being, perhaps they should be allowed to. On the other 
hand, the constitutional right to parental autonomy is not absolute. Even today, 
along with cracks in the parental immunity doctrine, parents’ privilege to raise 
children as they see fit could sometimes be challenged when child protection 
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and safety concerns arise.330 The state could in fact triumph over parental 
autonomy under some circumstances by regulating the parent–child 
relationship.331 Accordingly, children’s privacy rights should be treated as part 
of their welfare and thus not be easily waivable by their parents as a default.332
At the very least, COPPA should not promote such potentially deceptive 
practices without the child’s involvement in the process. If designed to 
safeguard children’s privacy, COPPA must not further foster violating that 
privacy by granting parents better tools to do so. It must not designate parents 
as surveillance officers. Policymakers should further address the parent–child 
dimension within the notions of notice and consent. By doing so, they can make 
children part of the solution to the risks of the digital era rather than reinforce 
an existing problem. 
C. Children’s Choice?
Accepting the potential arguments against this form of parental mediation 
does not necessarily lead to regulating IoToys. The sanctity of the family unit is 
important, and interference should be generally limited.333 Even if delicate 
regulation takes place, COPPA might not be the right tool for it. Still, regulators 
should at least acknowledge children’s privacy interests, in contrast to the 
concept of privacy as portrayed by parents. Not only does COPPA disregard
children’s view of privacy, it indeed enhances the violation of that privacy, as 
children perceive it. It takes away children’s freedom to decide what to disclose 
to their parents, as it promotes their full access to stored content. Essentially, 
COPPA fails to internalize the complexity of the child–parent relationship.334
Promoting the use of sophisticated spying devices for parents to discover 
their children’s secrets is not among the values embedded in COPPA regulation 
and should therefore be minimized through other factors. The parent–child 
relationship should not be set aside, and children’s trust in their parents should 
                                                                                                                     
330 See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 533, 557, 559–60, 573–75 (2013).
331 See Elaine M. Chiu, The Culture Differential in Parental Autonomy, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1773, 1786–90 (2008).
332 For an argument that privacy is not always a waivable right, see JULIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY 
PRACTICE 148 (2012).
333 See The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g 
(2012) (instituting federal law that protects the privacy of student educational records and 
allows parents the right to “inspect and review” them).
334 The parent-child relationship is frequently discussed in academic literature in various 
contexts. For a discussion of this relationship complexity, see, for example, Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 326 (1988); Janet L. Dolgin, The 
Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB.
L. REV. 345, 360, 362 (1997); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1766, 1779–81 (1993).
452 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:3
be taken seriously.335 Involving children in IoToys decisions could benefit their 
technological education and improve the parent–child relationship, and the 
understanding of privacy by both sides.336 Increasing children’s participatory 
rights, viewed as a positive liberty,337 could enhance children’s liberty and 
provide considerable privacy protection while affording their independence.338
Raising children’s awareness of IoToys devices’ ability to share their data 
with their parents should not be generally contested. There is no rationale behind 
parents knowing children’s secrets per se—such knowledge is meant only to 
safeguard children from revealing personal information that could be misused. 
Parents could achieve this purpose simply by listening to the communication 
from the IoToys device—without hearing their child’s answer.339 Also, children 
must be made aware of the practical—not merely abstract—risks of telling their
toy everything. To ensure trust, parents should simply talk to their children and 
explain that they might access their conversations. The “digital talk” could be 
important in this context.340 The participants could together decide, for instance, 
how to adjust the IoToys device’s privacy settings, when applicable, in ways 
that would best reflect both sides’ conceptions of privacy. 
Unfortunately, this rather intuitive solution will probably not be achieved 
easily, as it depends, inter alia, on diverse approaches to parenting. Some parents 
might disregard their children’s notion of privacy and choose not to share such 
information with them. That is why awareness should be raised not simply by 
parents but also by the state. Policymakers can raise awareness by design. They 
can oblige OSPs and toy manufacturers to communicate this information 
through the IoToys device throughout its use, especially in a toy’s first 
communication with a child. They could also oblige OSPs and toy 
manufacturers to grant children better control over their shared data by enabling 
them to listen to and delete their own recordings.341
Other regulatory ways of raising awareness could be achieved by investing 
in informative state-sponsored advertisements directed at children or obliging 
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toy manufacturers or IoToys OSPs to include this information in their 
advertisements. Thereafter the state could also invest in more general 
awareness-raising campaigns or even promote awareness through the education 
system.342 Along with awareness, policymakers must consider the notion of 
children’s autonomous choice within the concept of privacy and include them 
in the consent process. To this end, policymakers could oblige OSPs to obtain 
verifiable consent from the parents, but also from the children. Only on 
fulfilment of this dual-consent requirement could IoToys devices be activated. 
This consent model, while potentially objectionable to many parents, could 
further foster the protection of children’s liberty and autotomy. Children do have 
legal rights;343 in the context of privacy and IoToys, they should at least have 
the right to roll back the invisible boundaries of parental surveillance.
VI. CONCLUSION
IoToys might call for a shift in the perception of the collection and retention 
of children’s information online. These forms of regulation will most likely 
shape children’s conceptions of privacy. Essentially, children need not merely 
a right to privacy or to be let alone but simply the freedom to play with toys, 
without realizing that it is actually their parents who are toying with their 
privacy. Children need a liberty simply to be themselves. To properly mitigate 
the privacy risks that IoToys entails, policymakers must reevaluate the potential 
risks of IoToys to children’s privacy, including their need to keep secrets from 
their parents, and strike a proper balance between parents’ safeguarding their 
children from these risks while maintaining children’s autonomy. COPPA 
regulation must therefore be revisited and recalibrated to properly meet the 
challenges of IoToys. This Article suggests such a form of recalibration by 
revisiting COPPA’s requirements and adjusting them to IoToys. It surveys
various methods to promote awareness of the risks of IoToys: redefining the 
choice mechanism; requiring data minimization and transparency; increasing 
cybersecurity and enforcement; and finally, acknowledging children’s privacy 
interests by involving children in the process. 
Clearly, these practices may merely be a temporary solution for protecting 
children online and could become obsolete due to technological developments. 
If we consider IoToys in the broader context of IoT, we might argue that any 
attempt to safeguard children’s privacy in a society racing into a ubiquitous 
surveillance era would be futile. When children are surrounded by IoT devices 
that constantly gather data from them, sectoral regulation of devices that target 
children is perhaps no longer practical. Potentially, IoToys necessitates
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rethinking the legal framework altogether, not simply recalibrating it. But until 
such potential reform takes place, children’s privacy rights should not be 
forsaken. At the very least, the implications of IoToys and the internet of 
children has to be on the agenda of governmental or regulatory entities now, not 
in the future. Children should play with toys. But these toys should not play with 
their privacy.
